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Abstract 
 This dissertation includes two essays that examine mergers and acquisitions. In the first 
essay we examine how pay-for-performance influences the quality of merger decisions before 
and after Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX). Pay-for performance has a significant positive effect on 
acquirer returns of 0.9% pre-SOX and 1.1% post-SOX around the three day event window. 
Bidders with high pay-for-performance pay a 23.3% lower merger premium in listed target 
acquisitions. The positive effect of pay-for-performance is more important for public target 
acquisitions overall, for small acquirers pre-SOX, and for large acquirers post-SOX.  In the long-
run, bidders with high pre-merger pay-for-performance experience 27.6% higher returns after 
controlling for other merger characteristic. 
 In the second essay we investigate the value of customer/supplier relationships in mergers 
acquisitions. The findings show that targets (suppliers) with strong customer/supplier 
relationships obtain higher abnormal returns and higher merger premiums compared to targets 
with weak customer/supplier relationships.  However, targets that have a strong connection with 
a customer have lower odds of being acquired. Acquirers that purchase targets with strong 
customer/supplier relationships have negative long-run abnormal returns, suggesting that the 
acquirers may have overpaid for such targets. Implications of customer/supplier relationships on 
customers, rivals and competing rivals are presented. 
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Incentive Pay and Acquirer Returns – The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley 
1. Introduction 
The alignment of interests between managers and shareholders is especially important in 
corporate decisions in which the potential for shareholder wealth destruction is large.  As noted 
by Moeller et al. (2004) and others, mergers and acquisitions are one of these vulnerable decision 
areas for a number of reasons. For one, mergers typically reflect relatively large investments, and 
the bidder often pays too much for the target firm.  In many cases, the anticipated synergies 
never evolve.  In addition, by increasing the size of the firm, acquisitions may lead to higher pay 
for the CEO, regardless of the quality of the merger decision. Wessel (2006) notes, “it is obvious 
that the bigger the company, the more the CEO gets paid. That fact has inspired more than few 
big acquisitions. An old rule of thumb thus holds that for every 10% increase in company’s size, 
the CEO’s pay goes up 3%.” Consistent with this point, Hallock (2011) finds that firm size is one 
of the most highly correlated factors with CEO pay.  
Increasing the amount of equity holdings by managers presents one way to align the 
interests of managers and shareholders and to prevent mergers where the sole intent is to increase 
size. Datta et al. (2001) examine a sample of mergers from 1993 through 1998 and find a strong 
positive relation between acquiring managers’ equity based compensation, EBC (i.e., the value 
of new stock options granted as a percentage of total compensation) and stock price performance 
around and following acquisition announcements. However, Hall and Leibman (1998) argue that 
examining changes in the value of CEO’s equity holding (granted stock and stock option 
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holdings) is more relevant than the level of equity grants. They find that the elasticity of CEO 
compensation with respect to firm value is 3.3, which is 20 to 30 times larger than previous 
estimates that ignore the effects of changes in the value of stock and stock option holdings.   
Using a sample of bank mergers from 1991 through 2005, Minnick et al. (2011) are the 
first to examine how pre-merger pay-for-performance affects bank acquirers. They find that 
higher pay-for-performance sensitivity in bank acquirers leads to better acquisitions. Further they 
demonstrate that after sector-specific deregulation (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999), the 
impact of pay-for-performance has fallen.  This paper extends the analysis beyond the banking 
sector by incorporating recent mergers in diverse, non-regulated industries in which the incentive 
effects of pay-for-performance may be more pronounced than in regulated industries.  
Furthermore, to examine how market regulation, across industries, influences the incentive 
effects of compensation, we evaluate whether the positive influence of pay-for-performance on 
merger decisions changes after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX). The motivation for 
examining the pre and post-SOX periods is that there may be a partial substitution effect between 
the disciplinary influence of regulation and compensation.  That is, the governance changes 
imposed by this regulation are intended to hold managers more accountable and, thus, may 
reduce the importance of incentive-based compensation. In the analysis, we consider the 
compensation-related incentive effects of mergers more/less prone to hubris by examining small 
versus large acquirers and acquirers of listed versus unlisted targets.  In listed target acquisitions, 
we also examine the role of pay-for-performance on merger premiums.  While the paper is 
similar in focus to Datta et al. (2001), the paper differs in three distinct ways.  First, the paper 
utilizes a different, more complete, measure of the incentive effects of compensation, namely 
pay-for-performance sensitivity.  For example, as noted in Minnick et al., the pay-for-
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performance sensitivity of new option grants often only comprises a small percentage of total 
pay-for-performance.  In the sample, pay-for-performance sensitivity from new option grants 
accounts for just 8% of total pay-for-performance.  In addition, while Datta et al. examine the 
period from 1993 through 1998, the longer sample period from 1994 through 2010 enables us to 
examine the impact of regulatory changes on pay-for-performance sensitivity.  Finally, we 
investigate how the impact of pay-for-performance differs in acquisitions of public targets, as 
opposed to unlisted targets, as well as across size categories both before and after the regulatory 
changes. These findings allow us to determine the importance of pay-for-performance in 
different types of mergers in different regulatory environments, which has not been previously 
examined in the literature.  
Using a sample of 459 firm mergers from 1994 to 2010, the findings show that pre-
merger pay-for-performance has a significant positive effect on acquirer returns of 1.1% around 
a three day event window.  Furthermore, bidders with high pay-for-performance obtain 27.6% 
higher long run returns. These results are robust to controlling for important determinants of the 
market’s reaction to acquisitions. Bidders with high pay-for-performance pay a 23.3% lower 
merger premium in listed target acquisitions, suggesting that these types of bidders are less likely 
to overpay.  
We also examine the influence of SOX on the relationship between pay for-performance 
and the quality of the merger decision.  Pay-for-performance has a similar significant positive 
effect on acquirer returns both before and after SOX.  Thus, the value of this compensation-
related incentive effect of merger decisions has persisted after the increase in regulation.  
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We further observe a size effect in pay-for-performance sensitivity both pre-and-post-
SOX. Pay-for-performance is more important for small firms pre-SOX. While Moeller et al. 
(2004) suggest that large firms are more likely to make poor acquisitions due to hubris, they do 
not control for pay-for-performance sensitivity. We find that acquisitions by large firms with 
high pay-for-performance actually create value for shareholders post-SOX.  
We also examine the incentive effects of compensation on merger decisions involving 
listed versus unlisted targets.  Previous literature has suggested that agency problems may be less 
prevalent in acquisitions of unlisted targets, due to the lower likelihood of hubris-related merger 
motivations.  Consistent with this line of literature, our findings show that pay-for-performance 
is more important in public target acquisitions, both pre-and-post-SOX.  
Our paper contributes to the literature in the following ways.  First, we show that 
managerial incentives in the form of higher pay-for-performance are important for maximizing 
shareholder wealth in a broad sample of acquisitions. Higher pay-for-performance leads to better 
stock announcement returns and lower premiums paid by acquirers. This finding broadens our 
understanding of the role of managerial incentives in acquisitions. Datta et al. (2001) examine 
EBC, which comprises only a small part of pay-for-performance. Minnick et al. examine banking 
acquirers only and do not assess the impact of pay-for-performance on merger premiums. 
Second, pay-for-performance is important even in the presence of higher regulation. While the 
aim of SOX was to enhance corporate governance and strengthen corporate accountability for 
the benefit of the shareholder, our results indicate that pay-for-performance is still used 
effectively.  Third, we show that the effect of pay-for-performance is more prominent for 
acquisitions which are more susceptible to agency problems.  For example, the positive effects of 
pay-for-performance are greater in acquisitions of listed as opposed to unlisted targets.  While 
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Andrade et al. (2001) show that, on average, acquirers experience negative or insignificant 
abnormal returns on the announcement of acquisition of listed targets, in fact, acquisitions of 
listed targets by acquirers with high pay-for-performance can create value for shareholders. 
Finally, we indicate that the pay-for-performance impact varies across acquirer size categories 
with the introduction of regulation. This finding contributes to the literature that examines the 
impact of SOX on firms of different size.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, we provide background and 
develop testable hypothesis. In Chapter 3, we describe the data together with a univariate 
analysis. The main results appear in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 examines the long term performance of 
acquirers, and Chapter 6 concludes.  
2. Background and Hypothesis Development 
Previous studies have shown that compensation policy can provide value-increasing 
incentives to the CEO, as measured by better firm performance and better investment decisions.
1
  
For example, Mehran (1995) finds that return on assets and Tobin’s Q are positively related to 
the fraction of total compensation that is equity based. In examining the incentive effects of 
compensation in mergers, Datta et al. (2001) examine equity-based-compensation (EBC) levels 
and find a strong positive relation between an acquiring manager’s EBC and acquiring firm 
performance.  Furthermore, Minnick et al. (2011) find that high pay-for performance sensitivity 
is associated with better bank mergers over the period from 1991 through 2005.  
                                                          
1 We use CEO to proxy for a firm`s top-level management. The focus on the CEO is similar to several prior studies such as Brick et al. (2006, 
2008), Coles et al. (2006), Core and Guay (1999), Cremers and Grinstein (2009), Denis et al. (2006), Gao (2010), Jin (2002), Rajgopal and 
Shevlin (2002), and Yermack (1995). Further Aggarwal and Smwick (2003) find that CEOs pay-for-performance sensitivity is highest relative to 
other firm executives and that CEOs are responsible for overall firm policies. 
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While a strong pay/performance link is generally observed as having positive effects on 
firm decisions, the relationship between pre-merger pay/performance and post-merger 
performance is not obvious.  For example, Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian (2007) provide 
evidence that option compensation may encourage earnings management, and after controlling 
for this link, the relationship between incentive-based pay and performance is weak.  Also, Dow 
and Raposo (2005) find that CEO compensation can influence the kinds of strategies that firms 
adopt. The authors argue that performance-related compensation creates an incentive to look for 
overly ambitious and hard to implement strategies. Deckop et al. (1999) argue that a potential 
downside of pay-for-performance is that it may discourage employees from engaging in 
behaviors not linked to monetary rewards, including extrarole behaviors. One critical form of 
extrarole behavior is organizational citizenship behavior, which is employee behavior that goes 
above and beyond the call of duty, is discretionary and not explicitly recognized by the 
employing organization’s formal reward system, and contributes to organizational effectiveness.2   
While pay-for-performance may induce suboptimal behavior in some cases, we expect 
that, on average, pre-merger pay-for-performance positively influences the quality of merger 
decisions.  This leads to our first hypothesis: 
H1: CEOs with higher pay-for-performance sensitivity make better merger decisions, as 
reflected by higher returns both around the time of the merger announcement and following 
acquisition.  
                                                          
2 The literature suggests several other factors in addition to pay-for-performance that should improve firm performance. Conventional wisdom 
suggests that a greater level of independence allows for more effective monitoring and thus improved firm performance. Several papers 
demonstrate that an outsider-dominated board makes better decisions related to hiring and firing CEOs (Weisbach (1998), Borokhovich et al. 
(1996)) and negotiating takeover premiums (Byrd and Hickman (1992), Cotter et al. (1997)). The literature also stresses size of the board as a 
determinant of performance. Lipton and Lorsh (1992) and Jensen (1993) argue that larger boards may be less effective than smaller boards due to 
the director free-rider problem. Yermack (1996) and Eisenber et al. (1998) provide evidence that firms with smaller boards have higher Tobin`s 
Q.  Bebchuk et al. (2009) show that increases in the E-Index are monotonically associated with economically significant reductions in firm 
valuation as well as large negative abnormal returns during their examination period. 
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The literature examining the importance of compensation when governance is introduced 
varies. Hermalin (2005) argues that if there is a trend toward more vigilant governance, such as 
SOX, then the CEO effort should increase as monitoring increases, and the average CEO 
compensation should increase. Furthermore, in modeling the relationship between incentive 
compensation and governance, Dicks (2009) points out that, if forced to increase governance, 
firms will, in turn, lower incentive pay. Along similar lines, Chung (2006) has a theoretical 
prediction that board monitoring and CEO pay-for-performance are substitutes. Cohen et al. 
(2009) further argue that the passage of SOX resulted in a fall in compensation-based incentives 
to take risk, which is related to a decline in risky investments. They argue that two forces 
dominate CEO compensation post-SOX; the direct linkage effects causes CEOs to invest in less 
risky projects due to the increased personal costs of high risk projects. The compensation linkage 
predicts that boards anticipate the effect of the direct linkage on risk taking and increase 
incentive compensation to overcome this effect. Thus, this effect predicts an increase in risky 
investments. Cohen et al. (2009) find that post-SOX (until 2006), the standard deviation of stock 
returns fell, as did pay-for-performance, and they conclude that the direct linkage dominates the 
compensation linkage.  
In the period following SOX, there should be increased vigilance by investors, regulators, 
and auditors. The SOX reforms also forced firms to spend more on internal controls. In return for 
these higher costs, shareholders should face lower risk of losses and benefit from greater 
accountability of management.  Thus, the governance changes of SOX are likely to be associated 
with a reduction in importance of incentive-based compensation given that there is a regulatory 
framework which will hold mangers accountable. Therefore, based on the above, our second 
hypothesis can be expressed as follows: 
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H2: The impact of pay-for-performance should be lower post-SOX, given a negative 
relationship between incentive compensation and governance. 
Kamar et al. (2007) find that small firms have historically been more prone to financial 
fraud than large firms: Enron, Tyco and WorldCom aside. Indeed, Nicholas (2006) finds that 
smaller companies spent more time evaluating their accounting post-SOX as opposed to large 
firms. Nicholas (2006) concludes that the difference in findings may indicate that large 
companies did not feel a need to reevaluate their accounting practices, being more confident in 
what they had been doing in the past. Thus, this logic suggests that increasing pay-for-
performance in small firms, which are more subject to fraud and weaker reporting especially in 
absence of the external regulation, should result in higher quality mergers. Hence our third 
hypothesis:   
H3: There is a size affect in pay-for-performance sensitivity. We hypothesize that pay-
for-performance is more important for small acquirers’ pre-SOX given that smaller companies 
had weaker accounting practices pre-SOX.  
Previous literature has suggested greater likelihood of hubris-related merger motivations 
in listed target acquisitions.  Listed targets face higher bidder competition as well as higher 
publicity around the acquisition as opposed to unlisted targets.  In line with higher bidder 
competition, Ku et al. (2005) show that pre-merger publicity surrounding acquisitions of listed 
targets gives rise to bidding wars. In addition, Haunschild et al. (1994) show that the desire of 
acquiring managers not to lose credibility with others becomes more prominent in listed target 
acquisitions and leads to escalation of commitment. Our last hypothesis thus reflects the higher 
likelihood of hubris-related merger motivations in listed deals and is stated as follows:  
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H4: Pay-for-performance is more important in listed target acquisitions both pre and 
post-SOX as potential for hubris-motivated acquisitions is larger for acquirers of listed targets. 
3. Data 
The sample includes all completed US mergers with announcement dates between 
January 1
st
 1994 and December 31
st
 2010 as identified from the Mergers and Acquisitions 
database of Securities Data Company (SDC). We require that bidders have available stock price 
data from CRSP, accounting information from Compustat, executive compensation data from 
ExecuComp and, in a subsample analysis, governance data from Investor Responsibility 
Research Center (IRRC).  
We also require that the ratio of transaction value relative to the bidder’s value, as 
measured by the market value at fiscal year-end prior to the announcement, be at least 5%.  To 
clearly delineate the effect of each acquisition on long run returns, we include only those 
acquisitions that do not overlap. We define an overlap to occur if the gap between the 
announcement of one merger and the announcement of a second is no greater than five years. 
Finally, we require that the CEO be the same both at one year before announcement to the first 
year after announcement.  The final sample consists of 459 completed mergers made by 434 
firms
3
.   
4. Results 
Table 1.1 shows that acquisitions tend to be cyclical, as the total number of acquisitions 
closely follows the business cycle.  Consistent with the merger activity reported in Masulis et al. 
(2007), the period between 1997 and 2000 was characterized by strong merger activity.  Table 
                                                          
3 We follow Harford and Li (2007) in the sample construction. Except that we use a 5% transaction value relative to the bidder’s value and a five 
year overlap gap.  They obtain 370 all completed mergers (public and non) between 1993 and 2000. 
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1.1 also gives the industry breakdown of corporate acquisitions in the sample. The industries 
with the largest number of transactions are banking and business services. 
Table 1.2 presents the deal and acquirer characteristics both pre-and post-SOX one year 
before the announcement of the merger.  The average deal has a transaction value of $1.3 billion 
pre-SOX, rising to $2.1 billion in the post-SOX period. The average acquirer market 
capitalization is $5.6 billion, and the median deal value is 16.9% of the acquirer market 
capitalization, consistent with Masulis et al. (2007). In the sample, 33.01% of the deals are 
financed with stock pre-SOX and 5.69% post-SOX, while 17.67% are tender offers pre-SOX and 
11.97% are tender offers post-SOX. The percentage of focus increasing deals (defined as both 
the target and the acquirer having the same four digit SIC code) remains relatively steady 
throughout the sample period, at an average of 41.28% of deals. An examination of firm location 
shows that 77.63% of the targets are not located in the same state as the acquirer. In line with 
prior studies, bidding firms are performing well before the merger, although not as well in the 
post-SOX period, as the average ROA decreases from 12.14% to 9.84%.  
An examination of bidder firm volatility over time shows that the standard deviation of 
returns increases in the post-SOX time period. The average standard deviation of stock returns 
(STD_RET) rises from 45% to 54%. The standard deviation of stock returns is consistent with 
Zhang (2007), who finds that the implied volatility index for the S&P 500 portfolio (VIX) 
estimated by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) was 22% per year pre passage of 
SOX and increases to 34% per year post passage of SOX. She argues that failure to account for 
time-varying market volatility is likely to affect the reliability of the statistical tests of market 
returns. This suggests that the statistics based on VIX are underestimated. The rise in volatility 
11 
 
post-SOX is counter to Cohen et al. (2009), most likely since their sample stops in 2006 and 
avoids the financial crises years.  
Similar to Gao (2010), we use two variables to measure CEO incentive pay. The first is 
Jensen and Murphy’s (1990) pay-for-performance (PPS) statistic, defined as the dollar change in 
CEO wealth for a $1000 change in firm value. The second measure is the Core and Guay’s 
(1999) portfolio equity incentive (PEI) defined as the dollar change in CEO wealth for a 1% 
change in firm value. In this measure, we follow Core and Guay (2002) and estimate option 
deltas using the Black-Scholes option valuation model as modified by Merton (1973) to adjust 
for dividend payouts. As Core and Guay (1999) point out, the PEI is equal to the PPS multiplied 
by the firm’s market value of equity divided by $100,000. Our mean (median) PEI is $585,000 
($141,000), in comparison to $558,000 ($117,000) in Core and Guay (1999), and $389,000 
($112,000) for Gao (2010). Our mean (median) PPS is $33.01 ($9.43), in comparison to $25.00 
($5.29) for Hall and Liebman (1999) and $26.08 ($7.00) for Gao (2010). PPS is $31.82 ($9.73) 
pre-SOX and $34.65 ($8.78) in the post-SOX period. PEI is $635,000 ($124,000) pre-SOX and 
$516,000 ($179,000) post-SOX. There is no statistical difference in the PPS and the PEI, 
respectively, in the pre-and-post-SOX period.
4
   Figure 1 presents the median PPS and PEI over 
the sample period.  
Governance variables are collected from Investors Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC). As the IRRC data starts from 1996, information before that period was collected from 
the original 10-K reports made available on the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
database. Many studies find that the size and composition of board of directors can influence the 
                                                          
4
 Following previous studies we use the natural logarithm of PPS and PEI instead of the raw value in our regressions, as the distribution is 
heavily skewed to the right.  
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effectiveness of internal monitoring (Yermack 1996; Hermalin and Weisbach 1998).  The 
average board size is 10.4 with 7 independent directors. The average age of the CEO is 55 years 
and average E-Index of Bebchuck et al. (2009) at 2.6.  
Table 1.3 reports the correlation matrix among variables. Acquirers with higher PPS and 
PEI tend to have older CEOs (Age). The correlation between PPS and PEI in log form is 0.59. In 
level form, the correlation is 0.46, same to that reported in Gao (2010).  
Table 1.4 (Panel A) separates the firm characteristics of acquirers with high and low PPS. 
Acquirers with low PPS are larger, involved in larger deals relative to their market size and have 
lower discipline (higher E-Index).  Table IV (Panel B) separates acquirers based on high and low 
PEI. Acquirers with low PEI are smaller, involved in larger deals relative to their market size, 
have lower discipline, and lower ROA.
5
 
4.1. Univariate Analysis 
We obtain announcement dates from SDC and compute the cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) in a five day window (-2 to +2), where day zero is the announcement day. We use the 
CRSP value-weighted returns as the benchmark returns for calculation of abnormal stock returns.  
Table 1.5 (Panel A) shows the five day acquirer CARs. High PPS acquirers have a mean CAR of 
0.99%, while low PPS acquirers exhibit a mean CAR of -1.21%. The difference in mean is 
significant at the 1% level. When “Other deals” and “Unknown deals” as defined by SDC are 
removed (“Unknown deals” are deals with no payment information), the difference in CARs is 
stronger at 2.73%, significant at the 1% level.  We find that acquisitions by high PPS firms have 
                                                          
5
Some of the bidders with high PPS and PEI involve well known CEOs such as Gerdin Russell of Heartland Express, Warren Buffet from 
Berkshire Hathaway, Timothy Smucker from Smucker & Co, or Joe Ford from Alltel. 
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a positive difference in abnormal returns irrespective of how they are financed (“Other deals” 
and “Unknown deals” aside). The difference in CARs is higher than that reported in Datta et al., 
who report a CAR of -0.25% versus 0.30% for low and high equity-based compensation 
acquirers, respectively.  This more pronounced difference may be because PPS is a more 
complete measure of managerial incentives. 
Table 1.5 (Panel B) shows that high PEI acquirers have a mean CAR of 0.45%, while low 
PEI acquirers exhibit a mean CAR of -0.69%. The difference in mean is significant at the 10% 
level. When “Other deals” and “Unknown deals” are removed the difference in CARs is stronger 
at 1.62%, significant at the 5% level.  
A breakdown based on whether the acquisition involves a listed versus unlisted target in 
Table 1.5 (Panel C and D) confirms that high PPS and PEI have a stronger positive effect in 
listed target acquisitions. Specifically, in takeovers of public targets, the CAR for high PPS 
bidders is, on average, 2.51% higher than the CAR for low PPS bidders.  The comparisons in 
Table 1.5 ignore that firms and deals differ in other dimensions in addition to form of financing 
or target type. To take into account other determinants of abnormal returns, we estimate 
multivariate regressions.  
4.2. Regression Analysis 
Following Minnick et al. (2011), the following specification is used to test the hypothesis 
that pre-merger PPS improves the quality of merger decisions, as measured by bidder CAR. 
CARit = β0 + β1PPSit-1 + β2Ait-1 + β3Git-1 + β4Dit + Fit + еit          (1) 
14 
 
The dependent variable, CARit, is the cumulative abnormal stock return around the 
announcement for acquirer i for a deal occurring at time t. The key explanatory variable is PPS 
sensitivity measured pre-merger or PEI of the acquiring CEO. We control for acquirer 
characteristics (Ait-1), other governance variables (Git-1), and deal characteristics (Dit). We also 
include year and industry fixed effect (Fit), while еit is the error term.  
For acquirer characteristics, we control for bidder size as Moeller et al. (2004) find that 
acquirer returns are negatively related to bidder size, regardless of the method of payment.  
Bidder size is the log of market value of assets (MVA), measured as the book value of total 
assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity. Following Minnick et al. 
(2011), we also include a performance-based measure, return on assets (ROA). To control for 
firm governance, we include board structure variables commonly used in the literature:  board 
size (BSizeD), proportion of independent directors (BIndepD), the strength of shareholder rights 
(E-IndexD), and CEO age (AgeD). 
For deal characteristics, we control for method of payment (Stock), tender offer (Tender), 
focus increasing (Focus), and out-of-state deals (Out_State). Many studies report lower acquirer 
returns when acquisitions are paid for with stock, and higher returns when the merger is a tender 
offer or focus increasing. Interstate mergers are shown to offer fewer opportunities for increasing 
market power and fewer cost savings (Prager and Hannan 1998, Kedia et al. 2008). 
Table 1.6 (Panel A) summarizes the regression results based on PPS. The results are 
further divided into the pre-and-post-SOX period, with the variable of interest being PPS.  The 
findings show that a bidder’s pre-merger PPS has a significant positive influence on the 
shareholder wealth effects of the merger announcement.  In other words, after controlling for 
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other relevant merger characteristics, the results suggest that investors perceive that high PPS 
bidders make better merger decisions, on average.  In particular, a one-unit increase in PPS (in 
the logarithm) increases bidder CARs by 1.1%. Similarly, a firm which has high PPS (above 
median) prior to the merger results in 2.1% higher CARs. The PPS effect is important in both the 
pre-and post-SOX periods. Specifically, pay-for-performance has a significant positive effect on 
acquirer returns of 0.9% pre-SOX and 1.1% post-SOX.  The difference in the PPS effect between 
the two periods is not significant. 
We also examine the influence of PPS in separate subsamples of listed and unlisted target 
acquisitions.  The findings reveal that PPS is always more significant in listed target acquisitions 
both pre-and-post-SOX. This result suggests that PPS is important in acquisitions which are 
more susceptible to agency problems. Turning to the control variables, we find that large bidders 
are associated with lower announcement period returns, in line with prior research. Tender offers 
and focus-increasing deals benefit the shareholders, while stock and out-of-state deals are value 
destructive. The overall results are similar when we control for governance characteristics in 
Panel B of Table 1.6. 
Table 1.6 (Panel C) summarizes the regression results based on PEI. The results are very 
similar to the PPS regressions, showing a positive significant relationship between PEI and 
bidder shareholder wealth effects around the merger announcement. An acquirer which has high 
PEI (above median) prior to the merger results in 1.2% higher CARs. The PEI effect is again 
important both in the pre-and-post-SOX periods. Among the other governance variables, we find 
that announcement returns are higher when acquiring firms have smaller boards, consistent with 
Yermack (1996). In sum, the regression results show that pay for performance sensitivity has a 
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positive influence on bidder shareholder wealth gains at the time of the merger, regardless of 
whether incentive pay is measured by PPS or PEI. 
In Table 1.7, we examine if bidders with high incentive compensation pay a lower 
premium for listed targets after controlling for the same firm and deal characteristics as in the 
abnormal return regression.
6
 We find that bidders with high PPS are negatively and significantly 
related to the level of takeover premiums, in line with Datta et al. (2001). A high level of PPS is 
associated with a 23.3% decrease in takeover premiums paid by acquirers, relative to the mean 
takeover premium of 74.1% for acquirers with low PPS. Hence, the lower takeover premiums 
observed in acquirers with high PPS suggests that these bidders are less prone to overpayment, 
which is a possible explanation for the higher acquirer announcement returns in such 
transactions. 
According to Moeller et al., larger firms tend to be poor acquirers as they are more 
susceptible to value-decreasing motivations such as hubris. Thus, we predict that PPS is more 
important in larger firms. We divide the acquirers into three size categories. We define a small 
acquirer as a firm that has a market asset size in the bottom third of all acquirers, a medium 
acquirer as one that has a market asset size in the medium third, and a large acquirer as a firm 
that has asset size in the top third.    
The results are reported in Table 1.8. The findings show that the market perceives that 
high PPS bidders make better acquisition decisions than low PPS bidders, for both large and 
small acquirers. When the sample period is divided into the pre-and-post-SOX era, we see that 
PPS is only significant for big firms post-SOX, and is more important for small acquirers pre-
                                                          
6
 We follow Antoniou et al. (2013) and measure merger premium as the four-week pre-announcement premium. It equals the 
difference between the initial bid price and the target market price four weeks before the initial merger announcement divided by 
the same target price four weeks prior to the announcement. 
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SOX.  This evidence pre-SOX is consistent with Kamar et al. (2007) and Nicholas (2006), who 
find that small firms are more subject to fraud and weaker reporting standards. With the passage 
of SOX, the level of reporting standards increased especially in small firms, decreasing the 
importance of PPS.  The evidence post-SOX suggests that pay for performance is valuable for 
large firms, which previous studies indicate are more prone to hubris. The results in Tables 1.7 
and 1.8 are qualitatively the same for PEI.  
5. Long Term Performance 
Next we examine the long term performance of acquirers using both the calendar time 
portfolio approach and the buy and hold (BHAR) methodology. The reason we use the two 
approaches is that each methodology has its pros and cons, and there is no consensus in the 
literature as to which method is preferred. The advantage of the BHAR method is that it tends to 
capture the returns that a typical investor can earn (Kothari and Warner 1996; Lyon et al. 1999). 
The main disadvantage of this approach is that is more sensitive to the cross sectional 
dependence among the sample firms (Fama 1998; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). Additionally 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) argue that the BHAR methodology increases the mis-specified 
model problem. 
In order to mitigate these problems researchers recommend the use of calendar time 
methodology (Fama 1998). The disadvantage of this approach however, is lower power to detect 
abnormal performance because it averages over months of “hot” and “cold” event activity 
(Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). Since both the event time and calendar time methodology have 
their pros and cons, we utilize both methods.  
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We compute the five year buy and hold returns for high and low PPS firms. We compute 
the buy and hold returns as the difference between buy and hold returns of the sample firms and 
the benchmark portfolios. As such we calculate the buy and hold abnormal return (BHAR) for 
the sample of PPS firms as: 
BHAR (t1, t2) = ∏  
  
    (1 + Rit)] - ∏  
  
    (1 + Rmt)]          (2) 
where Rit is the return of the firm i on date t and Rmt is the return on a benchmark such as the size 
and book to market control portfolio on the same month t. The date t1 is the first trading month 
after the merger and t2 is the end of the time window.  
In the calendar time approach, we develop time series of monthly portfolio returns and 
estimate the three factor model of Fama and French (1993). Further, since momentum and 
liquidity have a significant influence on returns we add them to the Fama-French model. 
Specifically the Carhart (1997) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factors are added. The 
dependent variable is the difference in returns between portfolios of high and low PPS firms. We 
estimate the five factor model as follows
7
: 
RHPPS – RLPPS = a + b(Rit – Rft) + cSMBt + dHMLt + eUMDt + fLIQt + et          (3) 
where RHPPS is the monthly return of the calendar-time portfolio for high PPS firm in month t, 
RLPPS is the monthly return of the calendar-time portfolio for low PPS firm in month t, Rmt is the 
return on the CRSP value-weighted market index in month t, Rft is the monthly return on three 
month Treasury bill in month t, SMBt is the difference in the returns of small stock and big 
stocks in month t.  HMLt is the difference in returns of high book-to-market stocks and low 
                                                          
7 We follow the approach of Loughran and Ritter (1995) where the dependent variable is the difference in returns between portfolios of two types 
of firms in order to compare the difference in performance between them. 
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book-to-market stocks in month t. UMDt is the momentum factor in month t, and LIQt is the 
liquidity level in month. The intercept (a) provides an estimate of the difference in returns 
between portfolios of two types of firms. A positive and significant intercept can be interpreted 
as evidence to support the argument that firms with high PPS outperform those with low PPS in 
the long run.  
Table 1.9 reports the regression results where the five year BHARs is the dependent 
variable. After controlling for other relevant merger characteristics, the regression results show 
that acquirers with high PPS earn abnormal returns that are 27.6% higher than acquirers with low 
PPS.  When we decompose the acquisitions into pre-and-post-SOX, we observe that PPS effect 
is driven by listed target acquisitions. Acquirers of listed targets with high PPS earn 46.4% 
higher returns in the pre-SOX period, and 33.3% higher returns in the post-SOX period.  These 
findings make sense in light of previous evidence highlighting the perils of listed target 
acquisitions.  In particular, if acquirers of listed targets are more prone to overpayment, as 
compared to acquirers of unlisted targets, then pay-for-performance should play a more 
important role in influencing listed target acquisitions.  The results suggest that this is the case. 
Table 1.10 reports the results of calendar time series regressions based on a three and five 
factor model. The average abnormal monthly return for high PPS firms versus low PPS firms is 
0.38% for three factor model and 0.41% for the five factor model, both significant at the 10% 
level.  When we decompose the sample into pre-and-post-SOX, the results are only significant 
for the 3-factor model at the 10% level.  
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Overall, analysis of the post-merger performance, based on both BHAR methodology and 
factor regression models, provide moderate evidence of superior long-run performance for 
acquirers with high incentive pay. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper highlights the importance of pay-for-performance sensitivity in affecting the 
short and long-run wealth gains for acquirers. We find that acquirers with high pre-merger pay-
for-performance sensitivity have significantly higher stock returns around the time of the 
acquisition announcements and pay lower merger premiums. The importance of incentive based 
compensation is significant in both the pre-and-post-SOX periods. Thus, an increase in 
regulation has not diminished the importance of pay-for-performance in mergers. The 
significance of pay-for-performance goes beyond the regular factors that have been found 
important in the acquisition literature as determinants of returns (e.g. tender offers, or focus 
increasing deals). It goes beyond the governance factors, such as board independence as well. 
Pay-for-performance affects small and large acquirers and acquirers of listed targets. We 
attribute the importance of pay-for-performance in listed target acquisitions to the literature that 
these mergers are more likely to be plagued by agency problems. We explain the importance of 
pay-for-performance for small acquirers due to their weaker accounting practices especially pre-
SOX. The significance of pay-for-performance for large acquires indicates that it may be 
possible to increase shareholder value through incentive pay in these firms. In sum, we find that 
pay-for-performance provides managers with strong incentives to undertake value-maximizing 
acquisitions. 
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Inter-Firm Linkages and M&A Returns 
1. Introduction 
Extensive literature has examined M&A activity where firms acquire other firms for 
traditional motives, such as to improve efficiency and to promote growth. In this paper, we study 
an unconventional reason for takeovers, presumably to benefit from the supplier’s relationships 
with major customers. A major customer/supplier relationship exists when a supplier sells a 
significant portion of its output to a customer.  An example of this type of relationship involves 
Target and its major supplier, Mossimo, Inc. which was acquired by Iconix Brand in April 2006. 
On March 2000, Mossimo, Inc. announced a major, multi-product licensing agreement with 
Target under which Mossimo, Inc. would brand items sold exclusively at Target. In the 
acquisition of Mossimo, Inc. by Iconix Brand, the CEO of Iconix stated, “Mossimo is one of the 
largest apparel brands in the United States distributed exclusively through one of the biggest and 
most exciting retailers in the world (Target) and we are thrilled to be in a position to add it to our 
growing portfolio of strong consumer brands ...” In this example, Iconix did not have a major 
relationship with Target prior to the merger and, thus, could benefit from Mossimo’s existing 
relationship with Target.  
Strong customer/supplier relationships are often considered harmful for supplier 
performance.  This view can be related to research conducted by Galbraith (1952), Scherer 
(1970), and Porter (1974), who note that major customers may bully their suppliers by pushing 
for lower prices. A case in point is Wal-Mart and its history of “squeezing out every penny from 
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suppliers” (PBS Frontline 2004). In particular, Porter (1974) argues that “where retailer power is 
high, the manufacturer’s rate of return will be bargained down, certeris paribus.” Stern and El-
Ansary (1988) and O’Neal and Bertrand (1991) find that suppliers in strong customer 
relationships face higher inventory costs since often they are the ones responsible for holding the 
inventory. If this is the case, firms with strong customer/supplier relationships may be less 
attractive as targets, since these relationships may be less valuable to potential acquirers.  
An alternative theory is provided by Jackson (1985) who demonstrates that stronger ties 
improve efficiencies. Kalwani and Narayands (1995) and Kinney and Wempe (2002) argue that 
relationships foster information sharing. Kinney and Wempe (2002) find that firms that adopt 
just-in-time production management are associated with improved return on assets relative to 
non-adopters, and partnerships between suppliers and their trusted major customers accelerate 
the just-in-time process. Kalwani and Narayands (1995) report higher levels of return on 
investment for a sample of 76 manufacturers in long-term relationship with major customers.  
Jackson (1985) suggests that increased customer-base concentration provides supplier firms with 
benefits such as decreased marketing and administrative expenses. He argues that suppliers may 
be able to exploit their major customers’ reputations and brand names and use them as showcase 
accounts to attract other customers. Furthermore, Cowley (1988) examines a sample of strategic 
business units in the Profit Impact of Market Strategy (PIMS) database from 1973-1976 and 
finds that selling and advertising costs tend to be lower when there are fewer major customers to 
service.  These reasons, namely improved efficiencies generated by information sharing and 
lower marketing expenses, would make suppliers with strong customer/supplier relationships 
more attractive as potential takeover targets.  
27 
 
To investigate whether strong customer/supplier relationships are valuable in takeovers, 
we examine how these relationships influence the shareholder wealth gains for targets. We focus 
on takeovers of suppliers with large customers for several reasons. First, large customers account 
for a substantial portion of a supplier’s revenue. Secondly, US disclosure rules make the study of 
large customers more reliable, since suppliers must disclose the identities of major customers, 
but customers are not required to share such information about their major suppliers. The 
findings show that stronger ties between the target and the customer are associated with higher 
three day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) (30.5% vs 19.5%) for the target. Stronger ties are 
also associated with 21% higher merger premium. Furthermore, the benefits that targets receive 
from strong customer relationships are apparent after controlling for other relevant factors in the 
multivariate analysis.  The findings suggest that acquirers value strong ties, consistent with 
Patatoukas (2012), who shows that customer-base concentration has a net positive impact on 
supplier firm performance. 
To gain further insight into these merger transactions involving strong customer/supplier 
relationships, we examine the effects of these deals on customers, rivals, and competing rivals 
(rivals with significant sales to the target customer). We find that customers associated with 
suppliers that deem them important report significant returns of -1.49% around the merger 
announcement date. These results suggest that customers lose bargaining power when an 
acquirer announces the takeover of an important supplier. Rivals of suppliers with strong 
customer ties experience positive abnormal returns of 0.62% around the merger announcement 
date, while competing rivals (rival firms that sell to the target customer prior to the merger) 
experience returns of -1.64% around the same time window. The positive returns to rivals may 
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reflect their increased probability of a takeover. The fall in returns to competing rivals may 
signal the perceived increased competitive threat from the merged firm.     
Upon initial observation, a supplier with strong customer/supplier relationship would 
appear to be a good takeover target, based on the relatively high premiums paid for these targets.  
However, an examination of the post-merger performance of acquirers that have purchased 
targets with strong customer/supplier relationships shows that these acquirers perform poorly in 
the long run. In particular, the buy and hold returns on both the style-adjusted and market-
adjusted basis are negative. An examination of the post-merger period reveals that most of the 
customer/supplier ties are terminated after the merger. After investigating deals in LexisNexis 
we attribute the termination of ties to the change in dynamics of the merged entity which distorts 
the supply chain process.  
This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we show that 
acquirers value targets (suppliers) with strong customer/supplier ties. Acquirers pay a higher 
premium for targets with stronger ties, and these target firms experience better stock 
announcement returns around the time of the merger. This finding broadens our understanding of 
target ties in acquisitions.  While Fee and Thomas (2004) examine targets which may or may not 
be customers of supplier firms; in our sample, targets are always suppliers. The focus of our 
target firms is thus different. Further we make an important distinction between targets with 
strong customer ties and those without, which Fee and Thomas (2004) do not. Second, while Fee 
and Thomas focus on customers associated with bidders, our results provide new evidence on 
how acquisitions of supplier targets impact rival, customer and competing rival firms of the 
target firm. Third, the findings reveal that acquirer ties with the customer are seldom maintained 
after the merger and that the acquirer fails to benefit from the merger resulting in poor long-run 
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performance. This finding suggests that acquirers overestimate the value of such ties prior to the 
merger.  Finally, we show that the odds of being acquired fall as the customer/supplier ties 
increase. The targets that have strong ties are acquired by acquirers with high market-to-book 
ratios, suggesting that the merger may be driven by overconfidence on the part of the CEO. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, we provide background and 
develop testable hypothesis. In Chapter 3, we describe the data. In Chapter 4 we provide the 
univariate analysis. The main results appear in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 examines the long term 
performance of acquirers, and Chapter 7 concludes.  
2. Hypothesis Development and Related Literature 
Several studies investigate the influence of major customer/supplier relationships on 
various corporate policies including capital structure (Titman (1984), Maksimovic and Titman 
(1991)), corporate governance (Cremers et al. (2008)), and bankruptcy (Hertzel et al. (2008)). 
Fee and Thomas (2004) and Shahrur (2005) focus on customer/supplier relationships in mergers 
and acquisitions.  In examining takeovers of target with strong customer ties, our study takes a 
new perspective by investigating how large customer/supplier relationships affect target 
(supplier) shareholders. 
Relationships between individual suppliers and customers are major fixtures in business 
practice. These relationships are known to create operating interdependence across firms 
(Banerjee et al. (2008), Cremers et al. (2008)).  Our focus is to examine customer/supplier 
relationships in a merger framework. Previous studies provide some limited evidence on how 
mergers affect customer/supplier relationships in industry specific case studies relating to 
antitrust.  Mullin et al. (1995) examine the market reaction of customers to various events 
associated with the unsuccessful dissolution of US Steel that began in 1911. They find that 
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dissolution of US Steel would have lowered steel prices and raised output. The welfare 
consequences of the expanded output would have been substantial. Mullin and Mullin (1997) 
examine the reaction of customers to US Steel 1906 acquisition of Great Northern Railway iron 
ore properties. They find efficiency gains passed onto customers associated with the merger. 
Bittlingmayer and Hazlett (2000) examine the effects of antitrust actions against Microsoft on 
firms that produce complements or substitutes for Microsoft products.  Government action 
against Microsoft appears to inflict capital losses on the computer sector as a whole. Hertzel et 
al. (2008) examine the extent to which bankruptcy has intra-industry consequences. Distress 
related to bankruptcy filing is associated with negative and significant effect for the suppliers. 
Ahern and Harford (2013) investigate how inter-industry relations affect merger waves. They 
show that there are more inter-industry mergers between two industries when they have strong 
customer/supplier relations. The strength of the relationship is based on the amount of trade 
between the groups. Further cross-industry mergers are more likely when industries have greater 
R&D expenditures.  
Fee and Thomas (2004) construct a data set that identifies customers, suppliers, and rivals 
of the firms initiating the mergers. They find little evidence consistent with increased 
monopolistic collusion. They demonstrate that acquirers experience insignificant stock market 
reactions at announcement even in concentrated industries and for mergers that result in a 
significant increase in concentration.  Further they find positive returns to rival firms and no 
evidence that customers experience negative stock market reactions at announcement. Shahrur 
(2005) performs a similar analysis to Fee and Thomas (2004) except that he uses benchmark 
input-output matrices for the US economy to identify upstream and downstream industries, while 
Fee and Thomas (2004) identify individual companies with actual product market relationships. 
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Similar to Fee and Thomas (2004), Shahrur (2005) finds little evidence in support of 
monopolistic collusion, except in cases where suppliers are in concentrated industries.  Our paper 
differs from Fee and Thomas (2004) in that we examine supplier mergers, specifically focusing 
on suppliers (i.e., the targets) with major customer/supplier relationships to see if target and 
acquirer shareholders benefit from these relationships. Fee and Thomas (2004) examine targets 
which may or may not be customers of supplier firms. The focus of our target firms is thus 
different. Further we make an important distinction between targets with strong customer ties 
and those without. Target ties should have an impact not only on valuation but also on the 
probability of being acquired; issues not examined by Fee and Thomas (2004). Mergers also 
potentially have an impact on customers, rivals, and competing rivals associated with targets. Fee 
and Thomas (2004) examine the impact on customer and rival firms associated with the bidder 
only.  
Our focus on supplier acquisitions stems from recent work conducted by Chu et al. 
(2013) and Patatoukas (2012) who examine the supplier and its improved efficiencies if involved 
in strong customer/supplier relationship.  These suppliers could provide the acquirer with access 
to these improved efficiencies, thus making them potentially attractive takeover targets.  
Anderson et al. (2001) investigate to what extent these efficiencies are transferable, especially in 
mergers. They conclude by saying that the outcome of any acquisition depends on how well 
managers succeed in recognizing external relations and on whether established relationships can 
be retained.  Finally, Fee et al. (2006) examine a unique data set on the level of equity ownership 
that a customer has in the supplier. They find that relationships accompanied by equity 
ownership last longer than other relationships, suggesting that ownership aids in bonding trading 
parties together.  
32 
 
Chu et al. (2013) show that increase in distance (a measure of information asymmetry) 
between supplier and major customer is associated with an increase in the supplier’s R&D and 
performance. They attribute the rise in R&D with major customer to a more specialized product 
for the supplier, because a more specialized product could require more R&D input.  Patatoukas 
(2012) also reports that suppliers with a more concentrated customer base report higher 
performance. 
A supplier’s relationship to a major customer also has implications for the likelihood of 
takeover of the supplier. Heeley et al. (2006) examine a sample of acquisitions between 1990 and 
2000 and find that the size of the firm’s R&D is positively related to the likelihood of being 
acquired. Furthermore, they show that the higher the target’s operating performance in the year 
prior to the acquisition, the higher the probability of being acquired. They conclude that “by 
treating a target firm’s R&D expenditures as possible objective indicator of deeper capabilities, 
acquiring firms may be able to identify potentially attractive acquisition targets more quickly.” 
Our hypothesis is that, in addition to factors that have been found in the literature to determine 
the probability of being acquired, such as R&D or operating performance; suppliers with strong 
customer relationships should have a higher probability of being acquired. 
Strong ties with customers also have positive value implications for target shareholders.  
Specifically, given that potential acquirers value strong, established customer relationships, 
targets that possess these strong connections should experience higher shareholder wealth gains 
upon the announcement of the merger. Acquirers should also pay a higher a merger premium for 
targets with strong ties. 
The effect of mergers could have varying effects on customers, rivals and competing 
rivals that are associated with suppliers with strong customer/supplier relationships. The effect 
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on customer firms could be negative if the merger results in increased bargaining power on 
behalf of the merged entity. Fee and Thomas (2004) do not find this result but define customer 
firms as those of the merging firm rather than the target firm. In our paper, we define customer 
firms as those of the target firm given that the motivation for the merger is for the acquirer to 
develop a relationship with an existing customer of the supplier (i.e., target). The effect on rivals 
could be positive if the market believes that rivals might become takeover targets themselves, or 
that the rivals can benefit from improved efficiencies of the merged firm. The effect on rivals 
could also be negative if the acquiring firms gain a competitive advantage that would be difficult 
for rivals to imitate. The latter argument can be especially true of competing rivals when 
following the merger the merged firm gains ability to limit the rivals’ access to key inputs.  
The value of corporate relationships has been well documented in the finance literature. 
For example, Kalwani and Narayandas (1995) find that supplier firms in long-term relationships 
with select customers are able to retain and improve their profitability levels. Thus, we expect 
acquirers that have acquired targets with strong relationships to benefit from these ties in the 
long run.  However, the benefits to the acquirer are expected only if the acquirer is able to retain 
the customer relationship in the post-merger period.  If the customer ties are severed, then the 
acquirer’s long-run performance may suffer as a result of an expensive merger in which the 
anticipated benefits did not materialize.  
3. Data Description and Key Variables 
 Our initial sample includes U.S. suppliers and customers from Compustat Customer Segment 
database. Under FASB14, suppliers need to report the customer’s name and sales to the customer 
in their annual report to SEC if sales to the customer account for more than 10% of the supplier’s 
total sales. Note that firms often disclose information about customers that account for less than 
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10% of their sales if the customer is important to their business. However, Compustat does not 
report all customers’ names. We clean up the data by first identifying the customer which is a 
“Company”.  Then we match customers’ company names with Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) company names using word matching SAS code following Chu and Wang (2012). 
The program requires all of the letters in the reported customer name to be sequentially presented 
in the potential match. We also manually identify customers from the matched pairs of the text 
matching code. Following Chu and Wang (2012) if there are multiple matches we conservatively 
discard all these possible supplier-customer pairs.  We include public firms listed on the three 
major stock exchanges including AMEX, NYSE, and NASDAQ. We exclude financial firms 
(SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC Code 4900-4900) and also exclude REITs, closed-end 
funds, and ADRs. Our final sample contains suppliers and customers with relevant stock and 
financial information on CRSP/Computstat merged for the tests in our study. Our sample 
includes all completed US mergers of suppliers as identified from the Mergers and Acquisitions 
database of Securities Data Company (SDC) for the period 1988 to 2008. We require that bidders 
have available stock price from CRSP, and accounting information from Compustat. 
We follow Johnson et al. (2011) and measure if a customer is important or not based on 
sales to that customer divided by the total sales of the supplier. An important customer, 
STRONG_SR, is a dummy which is one if the ratio is equal to or greater than 15% and zero 
otherwise.  This measure is consistent with Johnson et al. (2011). The final sample results in 183 
observations.  
4. Univariate Analysis 
Table 2.1 shows that acquisitions tend to be cyclical, as the total number of acquisitions 
closely follows the business cycle.  The period between 1997 and 2000 was characterized by 
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strong merger activity.  Table 2.1 also gives the industry breakdown of corporate acquisitions in 
the sample. The industries with the largest number of transactions are business services.  
Table 2.2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of suppliers, customers and rivals 
partitioned by whether or not the supplier has an important relationship with a customer.  Panel 
A provides the results for supplier firms (targets). Those with important customers experience 
higher Tobin’s q and R&D. One key component is that customers are bigger than suppliers. This 
asymmetry potentially reflects the bias embedded in the data-generating process – namely, that 
by definition suppliers are reliant on their major customers whereas as major customers need not 
be reliant on their suppliers.  This hypothesis is also demonstrated by Patatoukas (2012).  
Lee and Masulis (2009) use the stock volatility of the suppliers as a measure of 
information asymmetry.  We see that suppliers with an important customer display greater 
information asymmetry than suppliers with weak customer relationships. The mean annual stock 
volatility of suppliers with no big customer is 18.47% versus 21.62% with an important customer 
(significant at the 10% level). Thus suppliers with important customers display greater volatility.  
Panel B shows that customers associated with suppliers that deem them important are less 
efficient in terms of research dollars spent to result in innovation. On average such customers 
spend $46 million dollars more per patent development than customers associated with suppliers 
who do not regard them as important. This result supports Das et al. (2006) who find that 
“rigidities, inflexibilities, and coordination issues that can affect (innovation) performance 
negatively” as supplier involvement in customer innovation increases.  Von and Tunalv (2002) 
find similar results. Panel C demonstrates that rivals display characteristics that are similar to 
those of the suppliers with whom they are contending.  
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We measure the acquirer, supplier (target), customer and rival announcement returns 
using the market model, 252 trading days are used prior to the event. We obtain the 
announcement dates from SDC and compute the CARs in a three day window (-1, +1) where day 
zero is the announcement date. We use CRSP value-weighted returns as the benchmark returns 
for calculations of abnormal stock returns and beta. Table III (Panel A) shows that there is no 
statistical difference in acquirer announcement CARs. Acquirers that acquired suppliers with 
strong (weak) relationship received -2.49% (-2.26%) abnormal return. Panel B shows that a three 
day target CARs are widely spread, ranging from -32.88% to 77.50% for targets with no big 
customers and from -38.11% to 146.81% for targets with big customers.  The average five day 
CARs for targets with no big customers is 19.5% and 30.5% for suppliers with a big customer. 
The difference is statistically significant. Thus, targets together with shareholders benefit from 
strong customer/supplier relationships at the merger announcement
8
.  
Panel C shows that customers associated with suppliers who believe them to be important 
have a significant mean CAR of -0.91% upon the announcement of the merger. Customers 
associated with suppliers that deem them unimportant don’t display a significant market reaction.  
The difference in mean is -1.12% and significant at the 10% level. Such market reaction provides 
initial evidence that customers that are associated with suppliers with strong customer/supplier 
relationships could potentially be hurt by increased bargaining power on behalf of the larger 
merged entity. This result is different to Fee and Thomas (2004). The difference lies in the fact 
that Fee and Thomas (2004) define customers as firms associated with bidders.  
Panel D provides CAR results for rivals. We define rival firms as those with the same 
four-digit SIC code as the supplier. On average each target firm has 48 rival firms. In univariate 
                                                          
8
 In thirteen mergers the acquirer has a major relationship with the target customer prior to the merger (It is a competing 
supplier). In three cases the acquirer was a major customer of the supplier. These cases are not driving our results. 
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results, rivals associated with suppliers that have strong customer/supplier relationships exhibit 
similar CARs to those with weak customer relationships. 
5. Main Results 
The comparisons in Table 2.3 ignore that firms and deals differ in other dimensions in 
addition to customer/supplier relationships. To take into account other determinants of abnormal 
returns, we estimate multivariate regressions. Table 2.4 tests the hypothesis in a multivariate 
setting. The dependent variable is the CARs return around the announcement for suppliers, 
customers and rivals associated with suppliers that demonstrate strong/weak customer/supplier 
relationships. Our key explanatory variable is the STRONG_SR dummy. We control for firm 
characteristics and include firm age (AGE), the amount of research and development expense 
scaled by total assets (R&D), the log number of patents (LNPAT), the Herfindahl Index (HHI), 
the amount of free cash flow (FCF), the log distance between the supplier and customer (rival) 
(LNDIST), the log of market value (LNMKTCAP), a performance measure (TOBIN), and past 
returns (PRET). A measure of firm volatility is also included (RETVOL).  For deal 
characteristics, we control for method of payment (STOCK), focus-increasing versus decreasing 
mergers (FOCUS), tender offers (TENDER) and the use of a defensive tactic during the 
acquisition process (DEFENSE). A supplier which has had strong customer/supplier 
relationships prior to the merger experiences a 10.17% higher CAR than targets without strong 
customer ties (Model 1). Thus the univariate statistics are supported in a multivariate setting. 
Model 2 reaches a similar conclusion to Model 1 that is a strong relationship prior to merger 
results in 10.53% higher CAR on behalf of the target. In Model 3 the thirteen mergers where the 
acquirer was a competing supplier are excluded from the sample to examine if the results are 
driven by these deals; the variable of interest continues to be significant.  In Model 4 we include 
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a control if the acquirer had a strong relationship with a customer other than the target customer 
but our results persist.  Consistent with previous studies, our findings show lower returns when 
acquisitions are paid for with stock, and higher returns when the merger is a tender offer.  
Suppliers with higher free cash flow and those located closer to the customer also generate 
higher CARs. 
9
 
As in the descriptive statistics, we also examine the influence of important 
customer/supplier relationships on customers and rivals (Table 2.5). Many of the results are 
similar to the descriptive evidence. Namely, the CAR around the three day announcement 
window for customers with important suppliers is 1.49% lower than the CAR for customers 
without important suppliers. The reason for this is attributed to the greater pricing power that the 
larger supplier will now have on the customer.  The multivariate findings add to the descriptive 
evidence showing that the size of the customer firm has a positive influence (0.72%) on the 
CAR. This might indicate that the loss of bargaining power is less prevalent in a larger customer.   
In Table 2.5 (Model 2), we see that the rivals of suppliers with strong ties experience 
significantly higher CAR’s than rivals of suppliers without strong customer ties. We attribute the 
higher CARs to rivals to increased probability that they will be taken over. Song and Walkling 
(2000) assert that rivals of acquisition targets earn abnormal returns because of the increased 
probability that they will be target themselves. Rivals with higher free cash flows experience 
higher CARs, while those with higher return volatility experience lower CARs. An interesting 
finding is when the target uses a defensive tactic to prevent the merger, rival firms fall by 0.73%. 
In 28 mergers the defensive tactic was used. Such finding could possibly indicate that when there 
is a danger of the merger not being completed, rival firm experience lower abnormal returns as a 
result of being taken over might not materialize. In Model 3 (Table 2.5) we see that competing 
                                                          
9
 In all model specification the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) factor on the variable of interest is below 2.  
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rivals, that is those rivals which are also important suppliers to the customer prior to the merger, 
exhibit significant lower abnormal returns upon the announcement of the merger. This finding 
gives support to the notion that following the merger, the combined firm gains ability to limit the 
rivals’ access to key inputs. 
Given that our merger sample is relatively small we run a bootstrap experiment. The 
reported statistics illustrate the significance of the relations described in Table 2.4 and 2.5. The 
bootstrap methodology that we use is the resampling residual method based on raw residuals.  
This method has the advantage that it retains the information in the explanatory variables. Table 
2.6 presents the results of the bootstrap based on 1000 iterations. The first row gives the 95% 
percentile interval while the second presents the mean of the iterations. Our results are very 
similar to those reported in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5, namely a supplier with important 
customer/supplier relationships prior to the merger results in 10.38% higher CARs. Customers 
associated with suppliers who deem them important fall by 1.49%.  
Table 2.7 presents the results on the relation between suppliers with strong 
customer/supplier relationships and takeover premium after controlling for the same firm and 
deal characteristics as in the abnormal return regression.
10
 We find that targets with strong 
customer/supplier relationships are positively and significantly related to the level of take-over 
premiums. A strong relationship is associated with a 21% increase in takeover premiums paid by 
acquirers, relative to the mean takeover premium of 65.19% (Table 2.2 Panel E) in targets with 
no such relationships. Hence, the higher takeover premiums observed in targets with strong 
customer/supplier relationships are consistent with the target CAR results in the previous tables. 
The negative sign on stock deals is consistent with Rappaport and Sirower (1999) who show that 
                                                          
10
 We follow Antoniou et al. (2013) and measure merger premium as the four-week pre-announcement premium. It 
equals the difference between the initial bid price and the target market price four weeks before the initial merger 
announcement divided by the same target price four weeks prior to the announcement. 
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in stock transactions, the synergy risk is shared in proportion to the percentage of the combined 
company acquiring and selling shareholders each will own.  
Next we seek to determine what factors acquirers deem important when acquiring a 
supplier controlling for customer/supplier relationships; we do this to make sure that our findings 
correspond to the findings of past literature. Table 2.8 estimates the logit model to find out what 
determines the suppliers odds of being acquired.  The dependent variable takes a value of one if a 
supplier was acquired from the entire sample of suppliers; zero otherwise. Suppliers with 
important customers are less likely to be acquired, as the STRONG_SR is negative and 
significant. Thus, for suppliers with strong customer/supplier relationships, the odds of being 
acquired are 0.71 times as large as the odds for a supplier with weak relationships.
11
  The 
coefficient on R&D is positive and significant. This signifies that suppliers with a large amount 
of R&D have larger odds of being acquired. The coefficient on LNPAT is negative and 
significant indicating that suppliers with lower amount of patent growth have higher odds of 
being acquired. Heeley et al. (2006) demonstrates that the size of the firm’s R&D is positively 
related to the likelihood of being acquired. Similarly Bena and Li (2012) show that targets with 
high R&D and low innovation are more likely to be acquired. They interpret this result as targets 
are very active in R&D but they are not successful innovators since they are not converting their 
R&D expenditures into patents at the time of the merger. Our paper provides further evidence 
that this is true of supplier firms.  
Further, the coefficient on FCF is positive and significant. Thus suppliers with higher free 
cash flow have larger odds of being acquired; this evidence is consistent with Leeb (2012). 
LNMKTCAP is positive and significant supporting the notion that large suppliers are more likely 
to be acquired. The estimated change in the odds of being acquired for a one unit increase in 
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 Exp (-0.35) = 0.71 
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LNMKTCAP is 1.21.
12
 This evidence is consistent with Hannan and Rhoades (1987) who find 
that targets with larger maker capitalizations and operations in urban areas are more likely to be 
acquired.  
Having established that stronger ties deter acquisitions; we next seek to determine what 
types of acquirers acquire suppliers with strong ties. We find that acquirers that do make 
acquisitions of targets with strong relationships demonstrate a higher market-to-book-ratio. The 
median market-to-book ratio of acquirers that purchase suppliers with weak relationships is 2.43, 
and 3.31 for those acquirers that purchase targets with strong relationships (significant at the 
10% level).  This finding provides preliminary evidence that these mergers could possibly be 
motivated by hubris. 
6. Long Term Performance 
Next we compute the five year buy and hold returns for acquirers that have acquired 
targets with strong customer/supplier relationships. We report the BHAR results on the basis of 
two alternative benchmarks. Specifically, we utilize the CRSP value-weighted index and a size 
and book-to-market Fama-French portfolios as benchmarks. We compute the buy and hold 
returns as the difference between buy and hold returns of the sample firms and the benchmark 
portfolios. As such we calculate the buy and hold abnormal return (BHAR) for the sample of 
firms as: 
BHAR (t1, t60) = ∏  
   
    (1 + Rit)] – ∏  
   
    (1 + Rmt)]          (1) 
where Rit is the return of the firm i on date t and Rmt is the return on a benchmark such as the 
CRSP value weighted index or size and book to market control portfolio in the same month t. 
The date t1 is the first trading month after the merger and t60 is the end of the time window. We 
compute the mean and median BHARs for portfolios of acquirers that have acquired targets with 
                                                          
12
 Exp (0.19) = 1.21 
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strong and weak customer/supplier relationships and report the results of parametric t-tests of 
differences in mean and median.  
Table 2.9 reports the five year mean and median BHARs. The BHARs are either market 
adjusted or style adjusted (using size and book-to-market benchmarks). We find that mergers 
which include an important customer/supplier relationship perform poorly at the mean and 
median in the long run. The mean five year market adjusted return is -15.56% and style adjusted 
return -16.76%. The median stands at -27.46% and -24.85% on the market and style adjusted 
method respectively.  
Table 2.10 examines the determinants of customer retention following a merger using a 
logit model.   The dependent variable takes a value of one if the combined firm is a supplier to 
the customer following the merger; zero otherwise.  All else equal, a supplier having major 
customer/supplier relationship pre-merger does not have a significant impact on the combined 
firm being retained as a supplier following an acquisition. Next, we examine acquirer ties with 
the target customer in Model 2 (STRONG_AR), or another customer (other than the target 
customer) in Model 3 (STRONG_ACR). It is of interest to note that in most cases the acquirer 
does not have ties with an important customer. More specifically, the acquirer has major ties 
with the target customer in only 13 deals, and the acquirer has major ties with another customer 
(but not the target customer) in only 24 deals. All else equal, an acquirer having a major 
relationship with the same customer with whom the target has ties has a positive and significant 
impact on the likelihood that the customer tie is maintained in the post-merger period. The odds 
also rise when the acquirer has a larger patent growth as well as a smaller market capitalization. 
Fee and Thomas (2004) reach a similar finding for suppliers, showing that suppliers to both the 
acquirer and target are more likely to be retained by the acquirer following the acquisition. In 
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Model 3 we demonstrate that when the acquirer has a major customer relationship with another 
customer (other than the target customer) the relationship is not likely to be retained with the 
customer.  
Table 2.11 decomposes the long run returns (on both a style adjusted and market adjusted 
basis) of terminated and retained firms based on either the target or the acquirer having a strong 
relationship with the customer (i.e., the target’s customer) prior to the merger. We are able to 
observe that most of the poor long run returns occur in mergers where the target has strong 
relationships with the customer prior to merger. These mergers, as shown before, are conducted 
by acquirers with high market-to-ratio, which suggests that hubris may have played a role in the 
merger motivation, if the market-to-book ratio is used as a measure of overconfidence. Graham 
et al. (2013) show that growth companies (high-market-to-book) are run by more confident and 
more risk tolerant CEOs; hence our measure. In contrast, acquirers that have strong relationships 
prior to merger have significantly lower book-to-market ratios (1.31) versus acquirers that do not 
have strong relationships (2.74) (significant at the 1% level). Further, we see that acquirers that 
have strong relationships with customers and are retained perform significantly better than those 
which are terminated. The difference is 17.82% and significant on a five year basis. This result 
would suggest that acquirer pre-merger relationships with the customer are more important than 
target relationships for determining long run success. The possible reason for this is that 
acquirer/customer relationships generate greater likelihood of retention and retention leads to 
higher abnormal long run returns. Acquirers that have a strong relationship with another 
customer (other than the target customer) and are not retained by the customer observe 18.11% 
abnormal performance, with those that are retained by the customer observing a 29.32% fall. 
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However, we are hesitant to draw any strong conclusions because of the small sample size of 
such deals.    
An interesting question that arises is why so many acquirer relationships are terminated 
following a merger, especially those relationships where the acquirer is not a competing supplier. 
Anderson et al. (2001) postulate that a relationship with a customer can end for several reasons: 
1) Following the acquisition the customer does not feel that the new firm will give the same 
priority to their orders and thus seeks a new supplier. 2) The new supplier charges a higher price 
to the customer due to the fact that there are fewer competitors. 3) The customer firm acquires a 
similar supplier. Calisir and Gumussoy (2009) find that the main reason why supplier 
relationships are terminated is “supplier firms do not make product deliveries in agreed time.” 
Similarly, Mitchell (2008) finds that the main reasons why supplier relationships end are: 1) 
Changing focus of the customer. 2) Supplier cannot accommodate needs. 3) Relationship just not 
“working” because of corporate cultures that don’t blend well with the customer. The majority of 
the papers seem to overlap on the inability of the supplier to accommodate the needs of the 
customer. In order to investigate reasons for termination, we examine news reports from 
LexisNexis. Although few news articles were found regarding supplier termination, the ones 
found matched the reasons postulated in the literature. For example, in April 1999 Richfood 
Holdings (after the acquisition of Super Rite Corp - which was a major supplier to Giant Food 
prior to the acquisition by Richfood) was dealt a major blow when Giant Food said it would not 
renew its $600 million supply contract. Two main reasons were stated. First, Richfood Holdings 
added a new customer, which now became Richfood’s largest customer; with a higher level of 
importance. Second, Giant developed a relationship with another supplier given the “shifting 
focus” of Richfoods.  We thus reason that in the event that the acquirer (Richfood) does not have 
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prior ties with the customer (Giant Food), the acquisition of the original supplier (Super Rite 
Corp) changes the dynamics of the merged entity which distorts the supply chain process.    
7. Conclusion 
This study examines whether strong customer relationships are valuable to targets and 
acquirers in mergers and acquisitions.  We find that suppliers with strong customer/supplier 
relationships obtain higher abnormal returns and higher merger premiums compared to targets 
with weak customer/supplier relationships. Customers and competing rivals demonstrate 
significantly negative returns upon the announcement of the merger. The evidence for customer 
firms can provide support for the loss of bargaining power on behalf of the customer. The result 
for competing rival suppliers provides evidence that the merged firm gains ability to limit the 
competing rivals’ access to key inputs.   
We document that the odds of being acquired fall as the customer/supplier ties increase. 
The targets that have strong ties are acquired by acquirers with high market-to-book ratios, 
suggesting that their CEOs may be overconfident. The existence of strong customer/supplier 
relationship on behalf of the supplier pre-merger does not guarantee retention post-merger. The 
presence of strong customer/supplier relationship on behalf of the acquirer suggests greater 
retention post-merger by the customer.   
Finally, the long term performance of the acquirers that purchase suppliers with strong 
customers/supplier relationship is poor. This finding suggests that acquirers overestimate the 
value of such ties prior to the merger.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Variable Definition 
 
AGE: The number of years since a firm’s founding date. 
 
DEFENSE: is an indicator variable set equal to one if the target used a defensive tactic.  
 
DIST: The distance in miles from supplier. 
 
FCF: The free cash flow (Income Before Extraordinary Items + Depreciation and Amortization – 
Cash Dividend- CAPEX)/Total Assets)) of a firm. 
 
FOCUS: is an indicator variable set equal to one if the merger was focus increasing (same four 
digit SIC code).  
 
HHI: The Herfindahl Index calculated as the sum of the squared industry market shares using 
sales data for all firms in the same two-digit SIC code from Compustat. 
 
LNDIST: the natural log of distance. 
 
LNMKTCAP: The natural log of the market value of equity. 
 
LNPAT: the natural log of patents. 
 
PATE: The average dollar amount (in millions) spent for patent development. 
 
PREMIUM: The difference between the initial bid price and the target market price four weeks 
before the initial merger announcement divided by the same target price four weeks prior to the 
announcement. 
 
PRET: Annual stock returns 
 
R&D: The amount of R&D expenditures divided by the amount of total assets. 
 
RETVOL: The standard deviation of monthly stock returns in the last 12 months.  
 
STOCK: is an indicator variable set equal to one if the deal was financed with stock. 
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STRONG_AR: An indicator variable equal to one if the acquirer sales to a target customer 
divided by the total sales of the acquirer is equal to or greater than 15% and zero otherwise 
(WEAK_AR). 
 
STRONG_ARC: An indicator variable equal to one if the acquirer sales to a non-target customer 
divided by the total sales of the acquirer is equal to or greater than 15% and zero otherwise 
(WEAK_ARC). 
 
STRONG_RR: An indicator variable equal to one if the rival sales to a target customer divided 
by the total sales of the rival is equal to or greater than 15% and zero otherwise (WEAK_RR). 
 
STRONG_SR: An indicator variable equal to one if the supplier (target) sales to a customer 
divided by the total sales of the supplier is equal to or greater than 15% and zero otherwise 
(WEAK_SR). 
 
TENDER: is an indicator variable set equal to one if the deal was a tender offer. 
 
TOBIN: The ratio of market value to book value of assets. 
 
Appendix 2: Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1.1: Acquisitions by Year and Industry 
The sample consists of 459 completed acquisitions announced during 1994 to 2010. The bidders 
are listed on SDC database and have the required executive compensation data in ExecuComp.  
Panel A breaks the sample by year. Panel B breaks the sample by industry. 
Panel A : Distribution by Year     
Year Frequency Percent 
1994 14 3.05 
1995 36 7.84 
1996 31 6.75 
1997 42 9.15 
1998 30 6.54 
1999 42 9.15 
2000 33 7.19 
2001 20 4.36 
2002 24 5.23 
2003 23 5.01 
2004 31 6.75 
2005 40 8.71 
2006 24 5.23 
2007 29 6.32 
2008 21 4.58 
2009 14 3.05 
2010 5 1.09 
  459 100.00 
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Table 1.1: Acquisitions by Year and Industry (Continued) 
Panel B : Distribution by Industry     
Aircraft 5 1.09 
Apparel 6 1.31 
Automobiles and Trucks 10 2.18 
Banking 31 6.75 
Business Services 46 10.02 
Business Supplies 8 1.74 
Candy & Soda 1 0.22 
Chemicals 17 3.70 
Communication 5 1.09 
Computers 18 3.92 
Construction 5 1.09 
Construction Materials 10 2.18 
Consumer Goods 7 1.53 
Defense 1 0.22 
Electrical Equipment 6 1.31 
Electronic Equipment 41 8.93 
Entertainment 4 0.87 
Food Products 11 2.40 
Healthcare 8 1.74 
Insurance 20 4.36 
Machinery 20 4.36 
Measuring and Control Equipment 15 3.27 
Medical Equipment 17 3.70 
Other 4 0.87 
Personal Services 6 1.31 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 23 5.01 
Pharmaceutical Products 13 2.83 
Precious Metals 2 0.44 
Printing and Publishing 9 1.96 
Recreation 1 0.22 
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 7 1.53 
Retail 20 4.36 
Rubber and Plastic Products 2 0.44 
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 1 0.22 
Steel Works Etc. 8 1.74 
Textiles 2 0.44 
Trading 16 3.49 
Transportation 10 2.18 
Utilities 13 2.83 
Wholesale 10 2.18 
  459 100 
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics by Pre and Post SOX 
The sample consists of mergers announced during the period January 1, 1994 to December 31, 
2010. All variable values are obtained at the fiscal year end before the merger announcement. 
MVE is the product number of shares outstanding and the stock price (in millions). TV is the 
transaction value of the merger (in millions). PROP is the TV divided by MVE. MVA is the 
book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus market value of equity (in 
millions). ROA is the accounting return on assets, obtained as the ratio of earnings before 
interest and taxes to total assets. STD_RET is the standard deviation of stock return over the 
prior five years. PEI (in thousand) is the sensitivity of the total value of stock and options held by 
a CEO to a 1% change in stock price. PPS is calculated as the dollar value change of stock and 
options held by a CEO per $1000 shareholder return.  BSize is the size of the board of directors. 
BIndep is the amount of independent directors. E-Index is the entrenchment index based on 
Bebchuck et al. (2009). Age is the age of the CEO. 
Panel A ALL ALL Pre-SOX Pre-SOX Post-SOX Post-SOX 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
MVE 5567 1385 4725 1199 6727 1790 
TV 1633 270 1256 204 2152 359 
PROP 33.33% 16.90% 31.61% 16.11% 35.69% 17.91% 
MVA 14163 2297 11012 1897 18472 2876 
ROA 11.10% 10.20% 12.14% 10.91% 9.84% 9.39% 
STD_RET 49.41% 36.47% 45.85% 34.48% 54.24% 39.99% 
PEI 585 141 635 124 516 179 
PPS 33.01 9.43 31.82 9.73 34.65 8.78 
%Stock 21.57% 0% 33.01% 0% 5.69% 0% 
%Tender 15.35% 0% 17.67% 0% 11.97% 0% 
%Focus 41.28% 0% 40.23% 0% 42.71% 0% 
%Out_State 77.63% 100% 75.44% 100% 79.17% 100% 
E-Index 2.57 3 2.28 2 2.89 3 
Bsize 10.41 10 10.72 10 10.05 10 
BIndep 7.25 7 7.19 7 7.31 7 
Age 55 55 55 54.5 54.7 55 
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Table 1.3: Correlation of Variables 
The table shows the correlation matrix of the explanatory variables. MVA is the book value of total assets minus the book value of 
equity plus market value of equity. ROA is the accounting return on assets, obtained as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes 
to total assets. PEI (in thousand) is the sensitivity of the total value of stock and options held by a CEO to a 1% change in stock price 
(natural logarithm is used). PEI (in thousand) is the sensitivity of the total value of stock and options held by a CEO to a 1% change in 
stock price (natural logarithm is used). PPS is calculated as the dollar value change of stock and options held by a CEO per $1000 
shareholder return (natural logarithm is used).  BSizeD is an indicator variable set equal to one if the board size is higher than the 
median. BIndepD is an indicator variable set equal to one if the percentage of independent directors on board is higher than the 
median. E-IndexD is an indicator variable set equal to one if it is higher than the median. AgeD is an indicator variable if the CEO 
older than 60.
 *
, 
**
 and 
***
 denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
BSizeD BIndepD E-IndexD AgeD MVA ROA Stock Tender Focus Out_State PPS PEI 
BSizeD 1 0.69
***
 0.16
***
 0.11
**
 0.45
***
 -0.10
*
 -0.07 0.03 -0.05 0.03 -0.28
***
 0.06 
BIndepD 
 
1 0.19
***
 0.07 0.39
***
 -0.11
*
 -0.09
**
 0.05 -0.11 0.03 -0.25
***
 0.04 
E-IndexD 
  
1 -0.04 0.01 -0.10 -0.08 0.06 -0.07 0.11 -0.07 -0.09
*
 
AgeD 
   
1 0.04 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.06 0.17
***
 0.21
***
 
MVA 
    
1 -0.14
***
 -0.08 0.07 -0.07 -0.03 -0.31
***
 0.44
***
 
ROA 
     
1 0.04 0.11
*
 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.01 
Stock 
      
1 -0.19
***
 0.05 -0.15
***
 0.13
**
 0.09 
Tender 
       
1 -0.03 0.13
**
 -0.03 0.04 
Focus 
        
1 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 
Out_State 
         
1 0.05 0.03 
PPS 
          
1 0.59
***
 
PEI 
           
1 
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics by PPS and PEI 
The sample consists of mergers announced during the period January 1, 1994 to December 31, 
2010. All variable values are obtained at the fiscal year end before the merger announcement. 
MVE is the product number of shares outstanding and the stock price. TV is the transaction 
value of the merger. PROP is the TV divided by MVE. MVA is the book value of total assets 
minus the book value of equity plus market value of equity. ROA is the accounting return on 
assets, obtained as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. STD_RET is the 
standard deviation of stock return over the prior five years. PEI (in thousand) is the sensitivity of 
the total value of stock and options held by a CEO to a 1% change in stock price. PPS is 
calculated as the dollar value change of stock and options held by a CEO per $1000 shareholder 
return.  BSize is the size of the board of directors. BIndep is the amount of independent directors. 
E-Index is the entrenchment index based on Bebchuck et al. (2009). Age is the age of the CEO. 
Where low PPS group is one where the pay-for-performance is below the median and high where 
it’s above. 
Panel A High PPS High PPS Low PPS Low PPS 
 
Mean Median Mean Median 
MVE 2815 848 8308 2587 
TV 659 129 2602 533 
PROP 29.28% 13.76% 37.35% 19.31% 
MVA 5712 1393 22577 4861 
ROA 8.16% 10.81% 10.82% 9.62% 
STD_RET 67.35% 45.46% 37.87% 28.61% 
PEI 921 246 250 70 
PPS 62.48 25.89 3.66 3.25 
%Stock 24.89% 0% 18.26% 0% 
%Tender 13.11% 0% 16.95% 0% 
%Focus 41.04% 0% 41.74% 0% 
%Out_State 79.48% 100% 75.21% 100% 
E-Index 2.41 2 2.68 3 
BSize 9.38 9 11.14 11 
BIndep 6.45 6 7.83 8 
Age 55 55 55 55 
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics by PPS and PEI (Continued) 
Panel B  High PEI High PEI Low PEI Low PEI 
 
Mean Median Mean Median 
MVE 9433 2042 1684 884 
TV 2642 361 619 213 
PROP 29.21% 13.55% 37.47% 20.42% 
MVA 24330 3276 3951 1575 
ROA 11.87% 10.91% 10.47% 9.65% 
STD_RET 55.47% 39.41% 43.36% 33.11% 
PEI 1106 381.64 61.58 56.11 
PPS 56.14 20.71 9.77 4.63 
%Stock 22.27% 0% 20.86% 0% 
%Tender 14.78% 0% 15.28% 0% 
%Focus 42.17% 0% 40.61% 0% 
%Out_State 79.56% 100% 75.11% 100% 
E-Index 2.43 2 2.71 3 
BSize 10.53 10 10.28 10 
BIndep 7.41 7 7.09 7 
Age 55 56 54 54 
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Table 1.5: Summary Statistics on Acquirer Returns 
The table summarizes acquirer returns, CAR over a five day period (-2 to +2) for different PPS 
and PEI groups. Where low PPS group is one where the pay-for-performance is below the 
median and high where it’s above. Where low PEI group is one where portfolio equity incentive 
is below the median and high where it’s above T and signed rank tests are performed to examine 
whether the mean or median returns are significantly different between positive and negative 
PPS acquirer. 
*
, 
**
 and 
***
 denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A 
 
Low PPS 
 
High PPS 
 
 N Mean  N Mean Diff. 
Stock Deals 42 -3.96% 57 1.11% 5.07%
*** 
Cash Deals 90 -0.01% 80 1.07% 1.08% 
Mix Deals 63 -2.39% 54 2.17% 4.56%
***
 
Other Deals 9 -1.38% 12 -1.75% -0.37% 
Unknown Deals 26 1.99% 26 1.41% -0.58% 
All Deals 230 -1.21% 229 0.99% 2.20%
***
 
 
Panel B 
 
Low PEI 
 
High PEI 
 
 
N Mean  N Mean Diff. 
Stock Deals 51 -2.43% 48 -0.78% 1.65% 
Cash Deals 87 -0.46% 83 1.51% 1.97%
*
 
Mix Deals 55 -0.88% 62 0.25% 1.13% 
Other Deals 9 -0.37% 12 -2.51% -2.14% 
Unknown Deals 27 2.12% 25 1.26% -0.86% 
All Deals 229 -0.69% 230 0.45% 1.14%
*
 
 
Panel C 
 
Low PPS 
 
High PPS 
 
 N Mean  N Mean Diff. 
Listed Targets 161 -2.31% 112 0.20% 2.51%
***
 
Non-Listed Targets 69 1.34% 117 1.75% 0.41% 
All Deals 230 -1.21% 229 0.99% 2.20%
***
 
 
Panel D 
 
Low PEI 
 
High PEI 
 
 N Mean  N Mean Diff. 
Listed Targets 136 -1.88% 137 -0.68% 1.20% 
Non-Listed Targets 93 1.06% 93 2.13% 1.07% 
All Deals 229 -0.69% 230 0.45% 1.14%
*
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Table 1.6: Acquirer Returns – Regression Analysis 
The dependent variable is the CAR over a three day period (-1 to +1). All independent variables are measured one year before the announcement. 
BSizeD is an indicator variable set equal to one if the board size is higher than the median. BIndepD is an indicator variable set equal to one if the 
percentage of independent directors on board is higher than the median. E-IndexD is an indicator variable set equal to one if it is higher than the 
median. AgeD is an indicator variable if the CEO older than 60. MVA is the log of market value of assets. ROA is EBIT over total assets.  
D_Stock is an indicator variable set equal to one if the deal was financed with stock. T_Offer is an indicator variable set equal to one if the deal 
was a tender offer. Focus is an indicator variable set equal to one if the merger was focus increasing. Out_State is a dummy variable equal to one 
if the target was listed in a different state to the bidder. PPS is the log of pay-for-performance sensitivity. PPS_D is a dummy variable if the 
acquirer had above the median log of PPS sensitivity. PEI is the log of portfolio equity incentives. PEI_D is a dummy variable if the acquirer had 
above the median log of PEI sensitivity. Year dummies (Y Dum) and industry dummies (I Dum) are employed. P-values are reported in brackets 
are adjusted for heteroscedasticity. Boldface indicates significance level at 10% or better. Panel A includes no governance variables. Panel C 
includes PEI which is the log of portfolio equity incentives. Panel B and Panel D includes governance variables for PPS and PEI respectively. 
 
 
  Panel A 
1994-
2010 
 
1994-
2010 
  
1994-
07.2002 
  
08.2002-
2010 
 
  All All  Listed  
Non-
Listed  
All  Listed 
Non-
Listed  
All  Listed  
Non-
Listed  
 
Deals Deals  Targets  Targets  Deals  Targets   Targets Deals Targets  Targets  
MVA -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 -0.005 -0.004 0.003 0.0151 -0.004 -0.002 0.017 
  [0.053] [0.081] [0.735] [0.237] [0.203] [0.389] [0.021] [0.271] [0.605] [0.137] 
          
 
    
 
    
ROA 0.084 0.089 0.127 0.076 -0.061 -0.015 -0.059 0.124 0.198 0.342 
  [0.046] [0.035] [0.022] [0.261] [0.349] [0.876] [0.481] [0.071] [0.011] [0.002] 
          
 
    
 
    
Stock -0.025 -0.027 -0.025 -0.021 -0.015 -0.006 -0.008 -0.031 -0.021 -0.053 
  [0.004] [0.003] [0.051] [0.141] [0.183] [0.701] [0.606] [0.052] [0.242] [0.044] 
          
 
    
 
    
Tender 0.025 0.026 0.035 0.025 0.019 0.031 0.032 0.034 0.019 0.171 
  [0.001] [0.005] [0.004] [0.625] [0.139] [0.051] [0.661] [0.034] [0.211] [0.021] 
          
 
    
 
    
Focus 0.014 0.015 0.013 0.025 0.018 0.021 0.031 0.015 -0.022 0.032 
  [0.041] [0.027] [0.112] [0.021] [0.056] [0.077] [0.047] [0.146] [0.791] [0.027] 
          
 
    
 
    
Out_State -0.018 -0.017 -0.015 -0.027 -0.015 -0.011 -0.038 -0.016 -0.009 -0.038 
  [0.017] [0.022] [0.132] [0.031] [0.145] [0.478] [0.026] [0.201] [0.494] [0.043] 
          
 
    
 
    
PPS   0.011 0.012 0.008 0.009 0.013 0.008 0.011 0.013 0.006 
    [0.003] [0.003] [0.047] [0.011] [0.011] [0.121] [0.011] [0.011] [0.319] 
          
 
    
 
    
PPS_D 0.021       
 
    
 
    
  [0.005]       
 
    
 
    
          
 
    
 
    
Y Dum YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
I Dum YES YES YES NO YES YES NO YES NO NO 
          
 
    
 
    
R2 21.61% 23.09% 22.74% 18.83% 23.25% 37.88% 20.23% 39.63% 33.24% 42.31% 
N 459 459 273 186 266 160 106 193 113 80 
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Table 1.6: Acquirer Returns – Regression Analysis (Continued) 
  Panel B 
1994-
2010 
 
1994-
2010 
  
1994-
07.2002 
  
08.2002-
2010 
 
  All  All  Listed  
Non-
Listed  
All  Listed  
Non-
Listed  
All Listed  
Non-
Listed 
 
Deals  Deals   Targets Targets   Deals Targets  Targets  Deals   Targets Targets  
BSizeD -0.019 -0.018 -0.002 -0.039 -0.025 -0.005 -0.055 -0.006 0.017 -0.015 
  [0.044] [0.061] [0.901] [0.016] [0.026] [0.729] [0.006] [0.629] [0.284] [0.537] 
          
 
    
 
    
BIndepD 0.011 0.011 0.013 0.014 0.091 0.005 0.012 0.011 0.016 0.007 
  [0.213] [0.203] [0.256] [0.412] [0.395] [0.694] [0.561] [0.379] [0.312] [0.749] 
          
 
    
 
    
E-IndexD 0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.007 -0.001 0.024 -0.001 0.001 0.004 
  [0.751] [0.694] [0.883] [0.923] [0.461] [0.884] [0.243] [0.993] [0.947] [0.817] 
          
 
    
 
    
AgeD -0.003 -0.007 -0.013 -0.017 -0.014 -0.021 -0.014 0.007 -0.001 0.018 
  [0.669] [0.427] [0.266] [0.222] [0.144] [0.100] [0.388] [0.581] [0.961] [0.389] 
          
 
    
 
    
MVA -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.011 -0.004 -0.007 -0.001 
  [0.159] [0.192] [0.115] [0.633] [0.644] [0.321] [0.193] [0.256] [0.096] [0.996] 
          
 
    
 
    
ROA 0.114 0.122 0.109 0.167 -0.053 -0.099 0.031 0.169 0.165 0.261 
  [0.008] [0.005] [0.035] [0.034] [0.353] [0.136] [0.768] [0.001] [0.009] [0.031] 
          
 
    
 
    
Stock -0.156 -0.018 -0.017 -0.019 -0.007 -0.006 0.019 -0.044 -0.032 -0.063 
  [0.100] [0.071] [0.145] [0.231] [0.487] [0.601] [0.281] [0.005] [0.096] [0.034] 
          
 
    
 
    
Tender 0.024 0.022 0.027 0.042 0.016 0.023 -0.002 0.017 0.026 0.097 
  [0.013] [0.017] [0.009] [0.421] [0.118] [0.022] [0.971] [0.231] [0.098] [0.219] 
          
 
    
 
    
Focus 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.024 0.011 0.009 0.034 0.011 0.008 0.026 
  [0.213] [0.151] [0.342] [0.041] [0.143] [0.371] [0.031] [0.278] [0.482] [0.123] 
          
 
    
 
    
Out_State -0.011 -0.011 -0.006 -0.021 -0.016 -0.008 -0.041 -0.002 -0.012 0.001 
  [0.161] [0.173] [0.481] [0.145] [0.074] [0.438] [0.019] [0.833] [0.409] [0.959] 
          
 
    
 
    
PPS   0.010 0.012 0.009 0.008 0.011 0.009 0.012 0.012 0.005 
    [0.003] [0.005] [0.056] [0.018] [0.018] [0.104] [0.001] [0.061] [0.396] 
          
 
    
 
    
PPS_D 0.016       
 
    
 
    
  [0.029]       
 
    
 
    
          
 
    
 
    
Y Dum YES YES YES YES YES NO NO YES NO NO 
I Dum YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
          
 
    
 
    
R2 31.33% 32.42% 42.11% 29.51% 18.92% 16.38% 22.83% 29.63% 28.11% 23.87% 
N 336 336 207 129 173 108 65 163 99 64 
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Table 1.6: Acquirer Returns – Regression Analysis (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
  Panel C 
1994-
2010 
 
1994-
2010 
  
1994-
07.2002 
  
08.2002-
2010 
 
  All  All  Listed  
Non-
Listed  
All  Listed 
Non-
Listed  
All  Listed  
Non-
Listed  
 
Deals  Deals  Targets  Targets  Deals  Targets   Targets Deals Targets  Targets  
MVA -0.011 -0.012 -0.009 -0.012 -0.013 -0.006 -0.022 -0.012 -0.008 0.006 
  [0.002] [<0.001] [0.071] [0.015] [0.001] [0.209] [0.001] [0.003] [0.021] [0.409] 
          
 
    
 
    
ROA 0.076 0.076 0.114 0.057 -0.076 -0.036 -0.074 0.115 0.177 0.323 
  [0.078] [0.071] [0.035] [0.396] [0.243] [0.715] [0.389] [0.093] [0.003] [0.003] 
          
 
    
 
    
Stock -0.024 -0.026 -0.021 -0.021 -0.015 -0.005 -0.009 -0.031 -0.021 -0.051 
  [0.006] [0.003] [0.056] [0.125] [0.191] [0.721] [0.583] [0.056] [0.267] [0.039] 
          
 
    
 
    
Tender 0.025 0.026 0.036 0.021 0.019 0.029 0.035 0.036 0.021 0.167 
  [0.011] [0.006] [0.001] [0.684] [0.134] [0.056] [0.675] [0.028] [0.166] [0.023] 
          
 
    
 
    
Focus 0.012 0.015 0.014 0.025 0.018 0.021 0.031 0.016 -0.004 0.031 
  [0.065] [0.031] [0.112] [0.023] [0.061] [0.089] [0.046] [0.141] [0.711] [0.034] 
          
 
    
 
    
Out_State -0.018 -0.017 -0.015 -0.027 -0.015 -0.009 -0.036 -0.016 -0.008 -0.039 
  [0.021] [0.028] [0.147] [0.035] [0.178] [0.521] [0.035] [0.201] [0.551] [0.036] 
          
 
    
 
    
PEI   0.008 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.007 0.009 0.006 0.006 
    [<0.001] [0.002] [0.047] [0.001] [0.011] [0.141] [0.011] [0.100] [0.231] 
          
 
    
 
    
PEI_D 0.012       
 
    
 
    
  [0.082]       
 
    
 
    
          
 
    
 
    
Y Dum YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
I Dum YES YES YES NO YES YES NO YES NO NO 
          
 
    
 
    
R2 20.69% 23.06% 31.67% 18.43% 23.53% 38.30% 20.13% 39.99% 30.35% 42.97% 
N 459 459 273 186 266 160 106 193 113 80 
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Table 1.6: Acquirer Returns – Regression Analysis (Continued) 
  Panel D 
1994-
2010 
 
1994-2010 
  
1994-
07.2002 
  
08.2002-
2010 
 
  All  All  Listed  
Non-
Listed  
All  Listed  
Non-
Listed  
All Listed  
Non-
Listed 
 
Deals  Deals   Targets Targets   Deals Targets  Targets  Deals   Targets Targets  
BSizeD -0.021 -0.018 -0.003 -0.037 -0.025 -0.009 -0.053 -0.006 0.017 0.002 
  [0.029] [0.055] [0.786] [0.021] [0.023] [0.535] [0.008] [0.651] [0.294] [0.738] 
          
 
    
 
    
BIndepD 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.013 0.007 0.007 0.013 0.011 0.013 0.001 
  [0.226] [0.231] [0.231] [0.417] [0.388] [0.635] [0.522] [0.441] [0.391] [0.845] 
          
 
    
 
    
E-IndexD 0.004 0.003 0.001 -0.002 0.007 0.001 0.022 0.001 0.004 0.001 
  [0.654] [0.621] [0.971] [0.872] [0.485] [0.997] [0.241] [0.933] [0.775] [0.383] 
          
 
    
 
    
AgeD -0.004 -0.008 -0.012 -0.011 -0.019 -0.021 -0.146 [0.009] 0.004 0.003 
  [0.592] [0.357] [0.271] [0.414] [0.111] [0.111] [0.397] [0.469] [0.822] [0.603] 
          
 
    
 
    
MVA -0.007 -0.009 -0.011 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 0.002 -0.011 -0.013 0.001 
  [0.008] [0.002] [0.006] [0.651] [0.123] [0.171] [0.807] [0.007] [0.006] [0.604] 
          
 
    
 
    
ROA 0.097 0.107 0.098 0.148 -0.074 -0.111 0.009 0.154 0.144 0.015 
  [0.026] [0.011] [0.061] [0.056] [0.196] [0.112] [0.924] [0.004] [0.021] [0.043] 
          
 
    
 
    
Stock -0.015 -0.017 -0.016 -0.015 -0.007 -0.004 0.018 -0.044 -0.031 0.017 
  [0.100] [0.061] [0.168] [0.367] [0.498] [0.716] [0.316] [0.005] [0.100] [0.032] 
          
 
    
 
    
Tender 0.028 0.025 0.031 0.039 0.018 0.028 -0.002 0.019 0.031 0.001 
  [0.013] [0.014] [0.006] [0.395] [0.168] [0.036] [0.969] [0.201] [0.058] [0.237] 
          
 
    
 
    
Focus 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.023 0.011 0.008 0.035 0.011 0.007 0.009 
  [0.273] [0.154] [0.354] [0.041] [0.146] [0.395] [0.028] [0.275] [0.511] [0.237] 
          
 
    
 
    
Out_State -0.009 -0.011 -0.008 -0.019 -0.015 -0.007 -0.038 -0.003 -0.012 0.001 
  [0.208] [0.178] [0.455] [0.153] [0.092] [0.481] [0.028] [0.754] [0.408] [0.987] 
          
 
    
 
    
PEI   0.007 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.003 
    [0.008] [0.055] [0.038] [0.084] [0.271] [0.111] [0.041] [0.225] [0.365] 
          
 
    
 
    
PEI_D 0.015       
 
    
 
    
  [0.046]       
 
    
 
    
          
 
    
 
    
Y Dum YES YES YES YES YES NO NO YES NO NO 
I Dum YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
          
 
    
 
    
R2 31.11% 31.91% 40.43% 27.87% 17.53% 12.45% 28.81% 28.38% 28.11% 23.99% 
N 336 336 207 129 173 108 65 163 99 64 
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Table 1.7: Acquirer Premium – Regression Analysis 
The dependent variable is the merger premium. The merger premium is defined as the four-week pre-announcement 
premium. It equals the difference between the initial bid price and the target market price four weeks before the 
initial merger announcement divided by the same target price four weeks prior to the announcement. BSizeD is an 
indicator variable set equal to one if the board size is higher than the median. BIndepD is an indicator variable 
set equal to one if the percentage of independent directors on board is higher than the median. E-IndexD is an 
indicator variable set equal to one if it is higher than the median. AgeD is an indicator variable if the CEO 
older than 60. MVA is the log of market value of assets. ROA is EBIT over total assets.  D_Stock is an indicator 
variable set equal to one if the deal was financed with stock. T_Offer is an indicator variable set equal to one if the 
deal was a tender offer. Focus is an indicator variable set equal to one if the merger was focus increasing. Out_State 
is a dummy variable equal to one if the target was listed in a different state to the bidder. PPS_D is a dummy 
variable if the acquirer had above the median log of pay-for-performance sensitivity. Year dummies (Y Dum) and 
industry dummies (I Dum) are employed. P-values are reported in brackets are adjusted for heteroscedasticity. 
Boldface indicates significance level at 10% or better. 
  1994-2010 1994-07.2002 08.2002-2010 
  Listed  Listed  Listed  
   Targets Targets   Targets 
BSizeD 0.151 0.298 0.033 
  [0.262] [0.198] [0.859] 
        
BIndepD -0.208 -0.258 -0.274 
  [0.108] [0.259] [0.131] 
        
E-IndexD -0.122 -0.267 -0.126 
  [0.291] [0.151] [0.505] 
        
AgeD 0.179 0.228 0.356 
  [0.147] [0.244] [0.101] 
        
MVA -0.037 -0.061 -0.048 
  [0.393] [0.395] [0.446] 
        
ROA -0.505 1.614 -2.497 
  [0.391] [0.237] [0.781] 
        
Stock -0.166 -0.457 0.017 
  [0.222] [0.039] [0.973] 
        
Tender 0.101 0.012 0.415 
  [0.387] [0.948] [0.059] 
        
Focus 0.115 0.061 0.139 
  [0.229] [0.691] [0.366] 
        
Out_State 0.101 0.01 0.168 
  [0.367] [0.961] [0.342] 
        
PPS_D -0.233 -0.043 -0.413 
  [0.033] [0.791] [0.048] 
        
Y Dum YES YES YES 
I Dum YES YES YES 
        
R
2
 53.46% 59.99% 70.61% 
N 207 108 99 
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Table 1.8: Acquirer Returns: Regression Analysis (Robustness Checks) 
The dependent variable is the CAR over a three day period (-1 to +1). All independent variables are 
measured one year before the announcement. Small, Medium and Large are indicator variables and equal 
to one if an acquirer is in low, mid- or top third based on market value of assets.  ROA is EBIT over total 
assets.  D_Stock is an indicator variable set equal to one if the deal was financed with stock. T_Offer is an 
indicator variable set equal to one if the deal was a tender offer. Focus is an indicator variable set equal to 
one if the merger was focus increasing. Out_State is a dummy variable equal to one if the target was listed 
in a different state to the bidder PPS is the log of pay-for-performance  sensitivity.  Year dummies (Y 
Dum) and industry dummies (I Dum) are employed. P-values are reported in brackets are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity. Boldface indicates significance level at 10% or better. 
  1994-2010 1994-07.2002 08.2002-2010 
 
All Deals  All Deals  All Deals  
Medium 0.027 0.043 -0.016 
 
[0.158] [0.091] [0.647] 
    
Large 0.003 0.016 -0.038 
 
[0.901] [0.523] [0.268] 
    
PPS*Small 0.018 0.019 0.009 
 
[<0.001] [0.008] [0.359] 
    
PPS*Medium 0.004 0.001 0.005 
 
[0.511] [0.986] [0.451] 
    
PPS*Large 0.011 0.007 0.013 
 
[0.047] [0.369] [0.061] 
    
ROA 0.086 -0.053 0.139 
 
[0.041] [0.408] [0.048] 
    
D_Stock -0.025 -0.015 -0.031 
 
[0.004] [0.171] [0.061] 
    
T_Offer 0.024 0.015 0.031 
 
[0.011] [0.258] [0.051] 
    
Focus 0.013 0.018 0.018 
 
[0.043] [0.061] [0.100] 
    
Out_State -0.016 -0.014 -0.016 
 
[0.034] [0.183] [0.201] 
    
Y Dum YES YES YES 
I Dum YES YES YES 
    
R
2
 24.61% 25.51% 41.45% 
N 459 266 193 
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Table 1.9: Acquirer Buy-and-Hold Returns – Regression Analysis  
The dependent variable is the BHAR over a five year period. The benchmark return adjustments 
are based on style-matched firms according to size and book to market ratio. MVA is the log of 
market value of assets. ROA is EBIT over total assets.  D_Stock is an indicator variable set equal 
to one if the deal was financed with stock. T_Offer is an indicator variable set equal to one if the 
deal was a tender offer. Focus is an indicator variable set equal to one if the merger was focus 
increasing. Out_State is a dummy variable equal to one if the target was listed in a different state 
to the bidder. PPS_D is a dummy variable if the acquirer had high pay-for-performance 
sensitivity. Year dummies (Y Dum) and industry dummies (I Dum) are employed. P-values are 
reported in brackets are adjusted for heteroscedasticity. Boldface indicates significance level at 
10% or better. 
  
 
1994-
2010 
  
1994-
07.2002 
  
08.2002-
2010 
 
  All  Listed  
Non-
Listed  
All  Listed 
Non-
Listed  
All  Listed  
Non-
Listed  
  Deals  Targets  Targets  Deals  Targets   Targets Deals Targets  Targets  
MVA 0.016 0.027 0.009 0.037 0.065 0.091 0.015 -0.052 -0.071 
  [0.688] [0.569] [0.901] [0.542] [0.369] [0.453] [0.757] [0.297] [0.461] 
        
 
    
 
    
ROA 1.088 0.674 1.054 1.598 0.915 1.127 0.815 0.901 0.101 
  [0.087] [0.408] [0.312] [0.129] [0.559] [0.436] [0.336] [0.244] [0.947] 
        
 
    
 
    
Stock 0.019 -0.071 0.286 -0.031 -0.037 0.401 0.313 0.456 -0.078 
  [0.882] [0.673] [0.192] [0.874] [0.881] [0.153] [0.121] [0.061] [0.834] 
        
 
    
 
    
Tender -0.093 -0.088 -0.632 0.086 0.068 -1.885 -0.407 -0.424 -0.583 
  [0.513] [0.591] [0.431] [0.683] [0.783] [0.144] [0.047] [0.042] [0.565] 
        
 
    
 
    
Focus 0.258 0.371 0.041 0.411 0.521 0.254 -0.036 -0.011 -0.289 
  [0.012] [0.004] [0.805] [0.011] [0.008] [0.323] [0.783] [0.939] [0.164] 
        
 
    
 
    
Out_State 0.041 -0.011 0.035 -0.038 -0.075 -0.302 0.264 0.155 0.673 
  [0.732] [0.944] [0.858] [0.824] [0.739] [0.298] [0.105] [0.412] [0.011] 
        
 
    
 
    
PPS_D 0.276 0.326 0.145 0.312 0.464 0.001 0.359 0.333 0.499 
  [0.026] [0.028] [0.497] [0.100] [0.044] [0.984] [0.021] [0.061] [0.052] 
        
 
    
 
    
Y Dum YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
I Dum YES YES NO YES YES NO YES NO NO 
        
 
    
 
    
R2 22.38% 31.45% 19.99% 27.55% 42.11% 24.94% 36.41% 19.19% 42.97% 
N 459 273 186 266 160 106 193 113 80 
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Table 1.10: Acquirer Factor Regressions  
Factor regressions for return difference between acquirers with high PPS and low PPS. The 
calendar-time period considered in this analysis represents a maximum of 60 months for each 
acquisition. The dependent variable is the difference in returns between portfolios of high and 
low PPS: 
RHPPS – RLPPS = a + b(Rmt– Rft) + cSMBt + dHMLt + eUMDt + fLIQt + et 
where Rmt is the return on the CRSP value-weighted market index in month t, Rft is the monthly 
return on three month Treasury bill in month t, SMBt is the difference in the returns of small 
stock and big stocks in month t.  HMLt is the difference in returns of high book-to-market stocks 
and low book-to-market stocks in month t. UMDt is the momentum factor in month t, and LIQt is 
the liquidity level in month t. P-values are reported in brackets. Boldface indicates significance 
level at 10% or better. 
 
1994-2010 1994-2010 1994-07.2002 1994-07.2002 08.2002-2010 08.2002-2010 
Variable 3-Factor 5-Factor 3-Factor 5-Factor 3-Factor 5-Factor 
Intercept 0.0038 0.0041 0.0052 0.0047 0.0053 0.0049 
  [0.083] [0.082] [0.091] [0.147] [0.092] [0.115] 
              
MKTRF 0.148 0.131 0.123 0.273 0.066 -0.017 
  [0.003] [0.016] [0.133] [0.001] [0.415] [0.842] 
              
SMB 0.298 0.301 0.286 0.273 0.394 0.403 
  [<0.001] [<0.001] [0.008] [0.001] [0.011] [0.008] 
              
HML -0.338 -0.348 -0.425 -0.429 -0.202 -0.201 
  [<0.001] [<0.001] [0.002] [0.003] [0.136] [0.164] 
              
UMD   -0.037   0.037   -0.164 
    [0.397]   [0.525]   [0.011] 
              
LIQ   0.016   0.036   0.077 
    [0.766]   [0.677]   [0.324] 
              
Adj R2 29.89% 28.49% 34.72% 34.11% 7.37% 11.11% 
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Table 2.1: Acquisitions by Year and Industry 
 
The sample consists of 183 completed acquisitions announced during 1988 to 2008. The bidders 
are listed on SDC database.  Panel A breaks the sample by year. Panel B breaks the sample by 
industry. 
Panel A : Distribution by Year     
Year Frequency Percent 
1988 5 2.73 
1989 4 2.19 
1990 4 2.19 
1993 3 1.64 
1994 5 2.73 
1995 2 1.09 
1996 10 5.46 
1997 14 7.65 
1998 21 11.48 
1999 31 16.94 
2000 15 8.20 
2001 15 8.20 
2002 5 2.73 
2003 12 6.56 
2004 9 4.92 
2005 12 6.56 
2006 11 6.01 
2007 3 1.64 
2008 2 1.09 
TOTAL 183 100.00 
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Table 2.1: Acquisitions by Year and Industry (Continued) 
 
Panel B : Distribution by Industry Frequency Percent 
Aircraft 1 0.55 
Apparel 1 0.55 
Automobiles and Trucks 5 2.73 
Business Services 31 16.94 
Candy & Soda 1 0.55 
Chemicals 3 1.64 
Communication 8 4.37 
Computers 22 12.02 
Construction 3 1.64 
Construction Materials 1 0.55 
Consumer Goods 2 1.09 
Defense 1 0.55 
Electronic Equipment 25 13.66 
Entertainment 3 1.64 
Fabricated Products 1 0.55 
Food Products 3 1.64 
Healthcare 2 1.09 
Insurance 2 1.09 
Machinery 5 2.73 
Measuring and Control Equipment 6 3.28 
Medical Equipment 8 4.37 
Personal Services 1 0.55 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 10 5.46 
Pharmaceutical Products 18 9.84 
Printing and Publishing 2 1.09 
Recreation 3 1.64 
Retail 2 1.09 
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 1 0.55 
Steel Works Etc. 3 1.64 
Textiles 1 0.55 
Trading 1 0.55 
Transportation 1 0.55 
Utilities 1 0.55 
Wholesale 5 2.73 
TOTAL 183 100 
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistic by Weak and Strong Customer/Supplier Relationship 
 
The table presents summary statistics. Panel A presents summary statistics for suppliers that have a 
strong/weak relationship with a customer. Panel B presents the summary statistics of customers that are 
associated with suppliers that demonstrate strong/weak relationships. Panel C presents the summary 
statistics of rivals that are associated with suppliers that demonstrate strong/weak relationships.  Rivals 
are firms whose primary four-digit SIC code is equal to the target (supplier) firms. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. To control for the possible effect of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 
1% and 99% level. 
*
, 
**
 and 
***
 denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Panel A 
         Suppliers 
 
Strong_SR 
   
Weak_SR 
  
Diff. 
Variables N Mean STD 
 
N Mean STD 
 
Mean 
AGE 74 12.73 11.35 
 
109 14.85 16.51 
 
-2.12 
R&D 74 15.45% 19.06% 
 
109 6.14% 8.57% 
 
9.31%
***
 
PATE 74 10.14 22.03 
 
109 8.36 20.78 
 
1.78 
HHI 74 6.31 7.49 
 
109 5.86 5.31 
 
0.45 
FCF 74 -17.61% 37.27% 
 
109 -4.82% 19.11% 
 
-12.79%
***
 
DIST 74 1042 873 
 
109 903 810 
 
139 
TOBIN 74 3.07 2.55 
 
109 2.22 1.99 
 
0.85
***
 
PRET 74 2.08% 8.07% 
 
109 2.38% 6.66% 
 
-0.30% 
RETVOL 74 21.62% 14.03% 
 
109 18.47% 18.47% 
 
3.15%
*
 
DEFENSE 74 17.56% 38.31% 
 
109 13.76% 34.61% 
 
3.80% 
FOCUS 74 35.14% 48.07% 
 
109 28.44% 45.32% 
 
6.70% 
STOCK 74 43.24% 49.88% 
 
109 30.27% 46.16% 
 
12.97%
***
 
TENDER 74 17.57% 38.34% 
 
109 21.11% 40.99% 
 
-3.54% 
          
          Panel B 
         Customers 
 
Strong_SR 
   
Weak_SR 
  
Diff. 
Variables N Mean STD 
 
N Mean STD 
 
Mean 
AGE 74 24.86 17.18 
 
109 25.62 16.11 
 
-0.76 
R&D 74 3.36% 6.02% 
 
109 2.18% 4.26% 
 
1.18% 
PATE 74 58.58 196 
 
109 11.88 29.65 
 
46.7
**
 
HHI 74 5.41 4.41 
 
109 5.95 5.82 
 
-0.54 
FCF 74 -0.51% 12.58% 
 
109 0.92% 8.67% 
 
-1.43% 
DIST 74 1041 873 
 
109 903 810 
 
138 
TOBIN 74 2.09 2.22 
 
109 2.01 2.31 
 
0.08 
PRET 74 1.56% 45.41% 
 
109 4.27% 41.46% 
 
-2.71% 
RETVOL 74 11.39% 7.82% 
 
109 11.44% 7.76% 
 
-0.05% 
DEFENSE 74 17.56% 38.31% 
 
109 13.76% 34.61% 
 
3.80% 
FOCUS 74 35.14% 48.07% 
 
109 28.44% 45.32% 
 
6.70% 
STOCK 74 43.24% 49.88% 
 
109 30.27% 46.16% 
 
12.97%
***
 
TENDER 74 17.56% 38.34% 
 
109 21.11% 40.99% 
 
-3.55% 
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistic by Weak and Strong Customer/Supplier Relationship (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
Panel C 
Rivals   Strong_SR       Weak_SR     Diff. 
Variables N Mean STD   N Mean STD   Mean 
AGE 3988 12.42 10.44 
 
4856 12.05 10.19% 
 
0.37
*
 
R&D 3988 14.32% 18.68% 
 
4856 11.39% 13.82% 
 
2.93%
***
 
PATE 3988 7.09 31.51 
 
4856 6.38 29.32 
 
0.71 
HHI 3988 4.19 2.19 
 
4856 4.38 1.93 
 
-0.19 
FCF 3988 -17.18% 38.84% 
 
4856 -14.34% 36.73% 
 
-2.84%
***
 
DIST 3988 1005 966 
 
4856 1058 970 
 
-53 
TOBIN 3988 1.81 2.29 
 
4856 1.84 2.31 
 
-0.03 
PRET 3988 0.01% 71.21% 
 
4856 -10.77% 80.67% 
 
10.78%
***
 
RETVOL 3988 18.33% 12.79% 
 
4856 20.27% 14.34% 
 
-1.94%
***
 
DEFENSE 3988 16.11% 36.76% 
 
4856 15.34% 36.05% 
 
0.77% 
FOCUS 3988 52.88% 49.99% 
 
4856 41.41% 49.27% 
 
11.47%
***
 
STOCK 3988 51.11% 49.98% 
 
4856 39.66% 48.93% 
 
11.45%
***
 
TENDER 3988 11.97% 32.46%   4856 11.64% 32.09%   0.33% 
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics on Acquirer Returns 
 
The table summarizes acquirer, target (supplier), customer and rival returns, CAR over a three day period 
(-1 to +1) for different groups. It also presents the merger premiums. Panel A presents CARs for acquirers 
that acquire suppliers with strong/weak relationship with a customer. Panel B presents CARs for suppliers 
that have a strong/weak relationship with a customer. Panel C presents CARs of customers that are 
associated with suppliers that demonstrate strong/weak relationships. Panel D presents CARs of rivals 
that are associated with suppliers that demonstrate strong/weak relationships. Panel E presents merger 
premiums. Rivals are firms whose primary four-digit SIC code is equal to the target (supplier) firms. All 
independent variables are as defined in Appendix A. To control for the possible effect of outliers, CARs 
are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. P-values are reported in brackets.
 *
, 
**
 and 
***
 denote significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A     Acquirer CARs (-1,+1)       
  n Mean STD Min Max p-value 
WEAK_SR 109 -2.26% 10.23% -39.84% 21.48% [0.02]
 **
 
STRONG_SR 74 -2.49% 9.86% -39.10% 23.04% [0.03]
 **
 
T-Test   -0.23%         
    [0.88]          
 
 
Panel B     Supplier CARs (-1,+1)       
  n Mean STD Min Max p-value 
WEAK_SR 109 19.54% 21.82% -32.88% 77.50% [0.01]
 ***
 
STRONG_SR 74 30.45% 32.83% -38.11% 146.81% [0.01]
 ***
 
T-Test   10.91%         
    [0.01] ***         
  
   
  
      
  
Panel C     Customer CARs(-1,+1)       
  n Mean STD Min Max p-value 
WEAK_SR 109 0.21% 4.99% -17.59% 22.30%   [0.65] 
STRONG_SR 74 -0.91% 3.98% -17.31% 6.76% [0.05]
 **
 
T-Test   -1.12%         
    [0.09] *         
 
 
Panel D     Rival CARs (-1,+1)       
  n Mean STD Min Max p-value 
WEAK_SR 4856 0.03% 10.08% -149.17% 158.84%  [0.86] 
STRONG_SR 3988 0.29% 9.21% -68.13% 142.61%  [0.04]
 **
 
T-Test   0.26%         
    [0.19]         
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics on Acquirer Returns (Continued) 
 
Panel E     Merger Premium        
  n Mean STD Min Max p-value 
WEAK_SR 109 65.19% 60.47% -27.79% 374.62% [0.01]
 ***
 
STRONG_SR 74 80.62% 80.89% -94.17% 434.86% [0.01]
 ***
 
T-Test   15.43%         
    [0.14]
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Table 2.4: Supplier Returns – Regression Analysis 
 
The dependent variable is the CAR over a three day period (-1 to +1). In Model 1-3 the information 
relates to the supplier firms. All independent variables are as defined in Appendix A. To control for the 
possible effect of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. P-values are reported in 
brackets.
 *
, 
**
 and 
***
 denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Variable Supplier Supplier Supplier Supplier 
  1 2 3 4 
STRONG_SR 10.17 10.53 12.34 12.56 
 
[0.046]
 **
 [0.036]
 **
 [0.019]
 **
 [0.018]
 **
 
STRONG_ARC 
   
3.58 
    
[0.618] 
AGE -0.41 -0.36 -0.51 -0.52 
 
[0.017]
 **
 [0.037]
 **
 [0.011]
 **
 [0.009]
 ***
 
R&D -0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 
 
[0.996] [0.871] [0.935] [0.941] 
LNPAT 0.92 0.42 0.219 0.18 
 
[0.86] [0.939] [0.961] [0.978] 
HHI -0.39 -0.35 -0.45 -0.44 
 
[0.38] [0.429] [0.338] [0.343] 
FCF 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.21 
 
[0.041]
 **
 [0.049]
 **
 [0.091]
 *
 [0.103] 
LNDIST -2.27 -2.22 -2.21 -2.21 
 
[0.091]
 *
 [0.089]
 *
 [0.109] [0.108] 
LNMKTCAP 0.18 -0.41 -0.63 -0.81 
 
[0.923] [0.841] [0.781] [0.723] 
TOBIN -0.96 -0.52 -0.85 -0.79 
 
[0.431] [0.676] [0.497] [0.535] 
PRET -0.14 -0.17 -0.06 -0.09 
 
[0.714] [0.651] [0.885] [0.832] 
RETVOL 0.35 0.39 0.41 0.41 
 
[0.151] [0.109] [0.109] [0.111] 
FOCUS 
 
-2.67 -1.73 -2.01 
  
[0.591] [0.748] [0.713] 
STOCK 
 
-10.79 -8.63 -8.33 
  
[0.042]
 **
 [0.131] [0.148] 
TENDER 
 
10.18 12.44 12.81 
  
[0.100]
 *
 [0.061]
 *
 [0.056]
 *
 
DEFENSE 
 
3.93 6.17 5.88 
  
[0.556] [0.368] [0.393] 
     
     FIXED EFFECTS (YEAR, INDUSTRY) YES YES YES YES 
     
     R2 39.86% 44.79% 47.66% 47.78% 
N 183 183 170 170 
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Table 2.5: Customer, Rival and Competing Rival Returns – Regression Analysis  
The dependent variable is the CAR over a three day period (-1 to +1). In Model 1 the information relates 
to the customer firms around important suppliers, Model 2 the rival firms around important suppliers and 
Model 3 for competing rivals. All independent variables are as defined in Appendix A. To control for the 
possible effect of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. P-values are reported in 
brackets.
 *
, 
**
 and 
***
 denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Variable Customer Rival Rival 
  1 2 3 
STRONG_RR 
  
-1.64 
   
[0.069]
 *
 
STRONG_SR -1.49 0.62 
 
 
[0.091]
 *
 [0.004]
 ***
 
 AGE -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 
 
[0.151] [0.898] [0.858] 
R&D -0.09 0.01 0.01 
 
[0.418] [0.441] [0.661] 
LNPAT -0.61 0.08 0.08 
 
[0.071]
 *
 [0.399] [0.425] 
HHI -0.09 -0.04 -0.02 
 
[0.395] [0.712] [0.859] 
FCF 0.02 0.01 0.01 
 
[0.666] [0.002]
 ***
 [0.001]
 ***
 
LNDIST -0.37 -0.02 -0.01 
 
[0.153]  [0.619] [0.717] 
LNMKTCAP 0.72 0.04 0.03 
 
[0.037]
 **
 [0.381] [0.519] 
TOBIN -0.48 0.03 0.04 
 
[0.051]
 *
 [0.489] [0.362] 
PRET -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
 
[0.471] [0.001]
 ***
 [0.001]
 ***
 
RETVOL 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
 
[0.667] [0.035]
 **
 [0.013]
 **
 
FOCUS 0.71 -0.33 -0.18 
 
[0.431] [0.126] [0.393] 
STOCK -1.24 0.14 0.27 
 
[0.216] [0.517] [0.259] 
TENDER -0.94 -0.21 -0.09 
 
[0.391] [0.633] [0.757] 
DEFENSE 0.77 -0.73 -0.67 
 
[0.514] [0.019]
 *
 [0.031]
 **
 
    
    FIXED EFFECTS (YEAR, INDUSTRY) YES YES YES 
    
    R
2
 28.13% 3.01% 2.96% 
N 183 8844 8844 
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Table 2.6: Bootstrapped Supplier and Customer Returns 
 
The table presents the results of the bootstrap using the resampling residual method based on 1000 
iterations of the model presented in Table 3. The first number is the 95% percentile interval from the 2.5
th
 
percentile to the 97.5
th
 percentile. The second number is the mean.   In Model 1 the information relates to 
the supplier firms, in Model 2 to the customer firms around important suppliers. All independent variables 
are as defined in Appendix A. To control for the possible effect of outliers, all variables are winsorized at 
the 1% and 99% level. 
*
, 
**
 and 
***
 denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Variable Supplier Customer 
 
1 2 
STRONG_SR (2.82, 17.79) (-3.01, -0.02) 
 
10.38
***
 -1.47
***
 
AGE (-0.61, -0.08) (-0.12, 0.01) 
 
-0.36
***
 -0.06
***
 
R&D (-0.38, 0.42) (-0.26, 0.09) 
 
0.03
***
 -0.09
***
 
LOGPAT (-7.87, 9.72) (-1.18, 0.08) 
 
0.69
***
 -0.61
***
 
HHI (-1.01, 0.35) (-0.29, 0.09) 
 
0.35
***
 -0.09
***
 
FCF (0.05, 0.42) (-0.05, 0.09) 
 
0.23
***
 0.02
***
 
LNDIST (-4.28, -0.17) (-0.81, 0.05) 
 
-2.21
***
 -0.37
***
 
LNMKTCAP (-3.71, 2.86) (0.09, 1.26)  
 
-0.48
***
 0.71
***
 
TOBIN (-2.51, 1.43) (-0.85, -0.06) 
 
-0.53
***
 -0.47
***
 
PRET (-0.76, 0.47)  (-0.02, 0.01) 
 
0.18
***
 -0.01
***
 
RETVOL (0.03, 0.77) (-0.11, 0.15) 
 
0.39
***
 0.03
***
 
FOCUS (-11.19, 4.92) (-0.77, 2.17) 
 
-2.74
***
 0.74
***
 
STOCK (-19.19, -2.29) (-2.83, 0.37) 
 
-10.87
***
 -1.24
***
 
TENDER (1.01, 20.62) (-2.75, 0.85) 
 
10.13
***
 -0.99
***
 
DEFENSE (-5.67, 13.94) (-1.39, 2.71) 
 
4.05
***
 0.74
***
 
   FIXED EFFECTS (YEAR, INDUSTRY) YES YES 
   
   N 1000 1000 
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Table 2.7: Acquirer Premium – Regression Analysis 
 
The dependent variable is the merger premium. The merger premium is defined as the four-week pre-
announcement premium. It equals the difference between the initial bid price and the target market price 
four weeks before the initial merger announcement divided by the same target price four weeks prior to 
the announcement. All independent variables are as defined in Appendix A. To control for the possible 
effect of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. P-values are reported in brackets.
 
*
, 
**
 and 
***
 denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Variable Premium 
 
(1) 
STRONG_SR 20.75 
 
[0.084]
 *
 
AGE -0.22 
 
[0.591] 
R&D -1.14 
 
[0.061]
 *
 
LNPAT 10.06 
 
[0.441] 
HHI -1.38 
 
[0.195] 
FCF -0.39 
 
[0.156] 
LNDIST -7.14 
 
[0.023]
 **
 
LNMKTCAP -2.26 
 
[0.587] 
TOBIN 0.51 
 
[0.868] 
PRET -0.07 
 
[0.938] 
RETVOL 0.69 
 
[0.227] 
FOCUS 6.14 
 
[0.607] 
STOCK -27.82 
 
[0.029]
 **
 
TENDER -18.94 
 
[0.201] 
DEFENSE 8.09 
 
[0.612] 
  FIXED EFFECTS (YEAR, INDUSTRY) YES 
  
  R
2
 49.14% 
N 183 
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Table 2.8: Logit Regression Explaining Strength of Supplier Ties 
 
The table shows the results from the multinomial logit model. The dependent variable takes a value of one 
if a supplier was acquired; zero otherwise. All independent variables are as defined in Appendix A. To 
control for the possible effect of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. P-values 
are reported in brackets.
 *
, 
**
 and 
***
 denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Variable Supplier 
 
(1) 
STRONG_SR -0.35 
 
[0.041]
 **
 
AGE -0.01 
 
[0.169]
 
 
R&D 0.02 
 
[0.009]
 ***
 
LNPAT -0.87 
 
[0.001]
 ***
 
HHI 0.04 
 
[0.338]
 
 
FCF 0.01 
 
[0.100]
 *
 
LNDIST -0.03 
 
[0.519] 
LNMKTCAP 0.19 
 
[0.001]
 ***
 
TOBIN -0.05 
 
[0.265] 
PRET 0.03 
 
[0.061]
 *
 
RETVOL -0.01 
 
[0.839]
 
 
 
 
 
 FIXED EFFECTS (YEAR, INDUSTRY) YES 
  
  R2 12.77% 
N 3868 
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Table 2.9: Acquirer Buy-and-Hold Returns 
 
The table reports the aggregate mean and median buy-and hold abnormal returns, BHARs (over five 
years) for firms that have acquired suppliers that have a strong relationship with a customer versus ones 
that did not. The benchmark return adjustments are based on either the CRSP value-weighted index 
(Panel A - Market Adjusted) or style-matched firms according to size and book to market ratio (Panel B - 
Style Adjusted). To control for the possible effect of outliers, BHARs are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
level. P-values are reported in brackets.
 *
, 
**
 and 
***
 denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
 
Panel A-
Market 
      BHAR (1,60) 
 
  
    
  n Mean Median STD Min Max p-value (Mean) 
p-value 
(Median) 
WEAK_SR 109 1.66% -0.01% 22.48% -68.36% 85.49% [0.447] [0.989] 
STRONG_SR 74 -15.56% -27.46% 76.19% -166.39% 194.22% [0.083] * [0.011] ** 
T-Test 
 
-17.22% 
    
 
  
    [0.032] **         
    
Signed-Rank 
  
-27.45% 
    
  
  
    
[0.001] *** 
          
         
 
 
        Panel B- 
Style 
      BHAR (1,60)     
    
  n Mean Median STD Min Max p-value (Mean) 
p-value 
(Median) 
WEAK_SR 109 -0.50% -0.05% 24.25% -111.23% 76.45% [0.813] [0.634] 
STRONG_SR 74 -16.76% -24.85% 77.71% -170.58% 213.92% [0.067] * [0.015] ** 
T-Test 
 
-16.26% 
    
 
  
    [0.049] **         
    
Signed-Rank 
  
-24.80% 
    
  
    
  
[0.001] ***       
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Table 2.10: Logit Regressions Explaining Retention of Suppliers 
The table shows the results from the multinomial logit model. The dependent variable takes a value of one 
if the combined firm is a supplier to the customer following the merger; zero otherwise. All independent 
variables are as defined in Appendix A. To control for the possible effect of outliers, all variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. P-values are reported in brackets.
 *
, 
**
 and 
***
 denote significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Variable Supplier Acquirer Acquirer 
  (1) (2) (3) 
STRONG_ARC 
  
6.89 
 
  
[0.111] 
    STRONG_AR 
 
3.15 
 
  
[0.001]
 ***
 
 
    STRONG_SR 0.44 
  
 
[0.441] 
  AGE 0.01 0.02 0.02 
 
[0.813] [0.554] [0.529] 
R&D 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
 
[0.553] [0.931] [0.867] 
LOGPAT 0.211 0.27 -0.01 
 
[0.644] [0.084]
 *
 [0.967] 
HHI -0.02 -0.03 0.18 
 
[0.722] [0.679] [0.198] 
FCF 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 
 
[0.868] [0.367] [0.143] 
LNDIST -0.04 0.08 0.519 
 
[0.824] [0.382] [0.061]
 *
 
LNMKTCAP -0.18 -0.31 -0.33 
 
[0.356] [0.091]
 *
 [0.157] 
TOBIN -0.23 0.03 0.05 
 
[0.331] [0.881] [0.931] 
PRET 0.08 -0.01 0.17 
 
[0.028]
 **
 [0.881] [0.267] 
RETVOL -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 
 
[0.041]
 **
 [0.221] [0.516] 
FOCUS 0.63 0.49 1.43 
 
[0.245] [0.448] [0.291] 
STOCK -0.37 -0.17 0.05 
 
[0.567] [0.801] [0.978] 
TENDER -0.89 -0.78 2.69 
 
[0.308] [0.351] [0.312] 
DEFENSE 0.19 0.79 1.11 
 
[0.819] [0.435] [0.491] 
    FIXED EFFECTS (YEAR, INDUSTRY) NO NO NO 
    
    R
2
 12.97% 31.13% 20.56% 
N 183 183 170 
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Table 2.11: Difference in Performance between Retained and Terminated Suppliers 
 
The table reports median buy-and hold abnormal returns (over five years) for combined firms that have 
acquired suppliers that did have a strong customer relationship (STRONG_SR) versus ones that did not 
(WEAK_SR). The groups are further subdivided on the basis of combined firm retention (retained) versus 
termination (terminated) post-merger.  The benchmark return adjustments are based on either the CRSP 
value-weighted index (Market Adjusted) or style-matched firms according to size and book to market 
ratio. The analysis is repeated for acquires that had strong relationship with customers (STRONG_AR) 
versus ones that did not (WEAK_AR). P-values are reported in brackets.
 *
, 
**
 and 
***
 denote significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
STRONG_SR 
  
STRONG_AR 
  
 
Terminated Retained Diff. Terminated Retained Diff. 
Market Adj. -24.70% -30.74% -6.04% -15.26% 2.56% 17.82%* 
Style Adj. -23.32% -31.67% -8.35% -9.48% 1.65% 11.13% 
N 65 9 
 
5 8 
 
 
 
WEAK_SR 
  
 
WEAK_AR 
  
 
Terminated Retained Diff. Terminated Retained Diff. 
Market Adj. -1.56% 0.13% 1.69% -2.88% -2.76%  0.12% 
Style Adj. -0.78% 0.50% 1.28% -3.23% -7.49% -4.26% 
N 98 11 
 
158 12 
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Figure 1: PPS and PEI Over Time 
The figure represents the pay-for-performance, PPS ((the change in CEO wealth (in dollars) for a 
$1000 change in firm value)) and portfolio equity incentive, PEI ((the change in CEO wealth (in 
thousands) for a 1% change in firm value)) through time. 
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